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Articles 
New Millennium, Same Glass Ceiling?  
The Impact of Law Firm Compensation 
Systems on Women† 
Joan C. Williams∗ and Veta Richardson∗∗ 
This Article reports on a survey of 694 law firm partners, virtually all women, who filled 
out an online survey about the impact of law firm compensation systems on women. The 
results were analyzed through the lens of thirty-five years of experimental social 
psychology studies of gender bias. Survey results showed considerable dissatisfaction 
among women partners with respect to their firms’ partner compensation systems. Thirty 
to forty percent of respondents were dissatisfied or extremely dissatisfied with their firm’s 
system, and minority partners were more dissatisfied than majority ones. Many 
respondents believed that their firms overvalued individual cash flow factors (origination, 
revenue and billable hours) and undervalued institutional investment factors 
(contributions to enhance the firm’s human capital), and that the systems lacked 
transparency. Disputes over origination credit were very common, with minority 
attorneys more likely than majority ones to experience them. About a quarter of majority 
equity women partners, and a third of majority income and minority women partners 
reported feeling “bullied, threatened or intimidated” in a dispute over origination credit. 
Respondents’ reported experiences track patterns of gender bias as described in the 
experimental literature. The Article ends with an extensive list of best practices to help 
firms address the problems identified in law firm compensation systems. 
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Introduction 
 
The system is completely unfair and rewards white males and those 
who are connected to those who are highly paid. 
 
[Our compensation system is p]robably the fairest system out there. 
 
These quotes summarize the good news and the bad news from the 
Survey of Women Partners on Law Firm Compensation (“Survey of 
Women Partners”) whose results are described in this Article.1 Some 
respondents were satisfied with their compensation and felt that their 
firms’ compensation systems were eminently fair. Other respondents 
were dissatisfied and felt their compensation systems were very unfair. 
Professional women have the largest gender wage gap in the entire 
economy: They earn proportionately less, as compared with professional 
men, than do women in non-professional jobs.2 The legal profession 
provides a stark example: While the wage gap between male and female 
engineers has evaporated, the wage gap between men and women in the 
law remains robust.3 A 2009 study of lawyers found clear evidence of a 
 
 1. Unless otherwise cited, the responses quoted in this Article are from responses given during 
the course of the survey. The quotations have been verified by the Authors against the primary source, 
and the responses and corresponding data are on file with the Authors. 
 2. See Trond Petersen & Laurie A. Morgan, Separate and Unequal: Occupation-Establishment 
Sex Segregation and the Gender Wage Gap, 101 Am. J. Soc. 329, 355 (1995). 
 3. See Ronit Dinovitzer, Nancy Reichman & Joyce Sterling, The Differential Valuation of 
Women’s Work: A New Look at the Gender Gap in Lawyers’ Incomes, 88 Soc. Forces 819, 843, 847–48 
(2009). 
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continued gender gap among lawyers working full time in private 
practice who were otherwise similarly situated.4 
Rigorous studies have suggested that law firm compensation 
systems probably play a role in the persistence of the gender gap in the 
law. For example, a 2004 study by Nancy Reichman and Joyce Sterling 
found that women lawyers were more likely to be dissatisfied with their 
compensation than were men: 14% of the women, but none of the men, 
rated their compensation systems as being on the bottom of a seven-rung 
scale.5 Only about half of women (51%), but closer to three-fourths of 
the men (71%), reported high levels of satisfaction.6 
Happily, the gender gap in law firm compensation has decreased in 
recent years. According to one study, women partners narrowed the 
gender gap in compensation from 69% in 1993 to 78% in 1999.7 Yet two 
studies by the National Association of Women Lawyers (“NAWL”) 
found that dramatic pay differentials persist. NAWL’s 2009 report found 
women equity partners typically earning about $66,000 less than their 
male counterparts8—an improvement over the $87,000 differential they 
found in 2008,9 probably due to overall declines in compensation caused 
by the Great Recession.10 The wage gap among income partners also 
remains substantial: In 2009, male income partners averaged $25,000 
more than female income partners.11 Another factor depressing the 
compensation of women partners is that women, as a group, take longer 
to attain the rank of equity partner than do men.12 
The most common explanations for differentials between male and 
female partners are that women’s family responsibilities mean that they 
do not spend the hours necessary to develop business, or that they are 
more likely to go into less lucrative legal specialties.13 While no studies of 
gender differentials in partner compensation are available, one study 
 
 4. Id. at 843. 
 5. Nancy J. Reichman & Joyce S. Sterling, Sticky Floors, Broken Steps, and Concrete Ceilings in 
Legal Careers, 14 Tex. J. Women & L. 27, 46–47 (2004). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 37. 
 8. Nat’l Ass’n of Women Lawyers & NAWL Found., Report of the Fourth Annual 
National Survey on Retention and Promotion of Women in Law Firms 11–12 (2009) [hereinafter 
NAWL, 2009 Report].  
 9. Nat’l Ass’n of Women Lawyers & NAWL Found., Report of the Third Annual National 
Survey on Retention and Promotion of Women in Law Firms 13–14 (2008).  
 10. Bernard Burk & David McGowan, Schumpeter, Coase and the Future of the (Law) Firm 
1 (Mar. 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Georgetown Law Center for the Study of 
the Legal Profession), available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/LegalProfession/documents/ 
BurkMcGowan.pdf. 
 11. NAWL, 2009 Report, supra note 8, at 11.  
 12. Id. at 8. 
 13. See, e.g., Mary C. Noonan, Mary E. Corcoran & Paul N. Courant, Is the Partnership Gap 
Closing for Women? Cohort Differences in the Sex Gap in Partnership Chances, 37 Soc. Sci. Res. 156, 
157–58 (2007). 
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discounted these explanations for why men are more likely to become 
partners—at a rate that has not decreased since women entered the law 
in significant numbers in the late 1970s.14 “Male graduates are more likely 
than female graduates to be partners even when men and women have 
comparable career plans, law school GPAs, marital status, parental 
status, work histories, and legal specializations. Sex also strongly predicts 
partnership among” lawyers, a correlation that remains robust even 
among more recent law school graduates, conclude Mary Noonan, Mary 
Corcoran, and Paul Courant.15 
The 2009 study by Ronit Dinovitzer, Nancy Reichman, and Joyce 
Sterling found that the wage gap among young lawyers preparing for 
partnership does not result from the human capital women bring to their 
careers, or from their childrearing responsibilities.16 “Lifestyle” 
considerations result in a modest narrowing of the gender gap.17 A much 
larger factor is what sociologists call “opportunity paths”: networking 
opportunities and the ability to work on career-enhancing assignments.18 
“These findings confirm that in professional settings such as law firms, 
where work assignments travel from senior to more junior employees, 
socializing with more senior lawyers in both work and non-work settings 
can directly affect earnings.”19 The study found that the field of law also 
contributes to the gender gap: “[T]he gender wage gap we find in our 
research signals that there may be something unique in the early 
professional work of lawyers that allows for the kind of subjective 
assessments and interactions that underlie differences in pay and account 
for significant within-occupation wage gaps.”20 
Forty years ago, most large law firms had no more than a few 
hundred attorneys, along with lockstep compensation systems.21 Lockstep 
systems both assumed and created a symbiosis between “finders, minders 
and grinders”: attorneys whose skill set rested on finding new clients, 
attorneys who were best at binding existing clients to the firm through 
attentive relationship skills, and attorneys who produced the high-quality 
legal work that fed the whole machine.22 Most large firms had stable 
long-term relationships with institutional clients whom everyone—both 
attorneys and clients—assumed would not change firms absent dramatic 
 
 14. Id. at 173–76. 
 15. Id. at 170–71. 
 16. Dinovitzer, Reichman & Sterling, supra note 3, at 846–47. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 847. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 848 (citation omitted). 
 21. See Marc Galanter & Thomas Palay, Tournaments of Lawyers: The Transformation of 
the Big Law Firm 22, 42 (1991). 
 22. See id. at 52 n.109. 
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misbehavior.23 Nor did partners leave their firms: this was frowned upon, 
and consequently rare.24 Moreover, in all but a few firms, lawyers made 
very high middle-class salaries but did not expect to move into the ranks 
of the truly wealthy.25 
Today, much has changed. As investment banking salaries exploded 
in the 1990s, large-firm New York lawyers’ salary expectations rose 
sharply: Top partners looked at the millions their clients were making, 
and asked themselves why their salaries were not equivalent. This began 
a cycle in which the ratio between the highest- and lowest-paid partners 
climbed sharply. In mid-sized firms, top partners now average six times 
the compensation of their firms’ lowest-paid partners.26 In large firms, the 
ratio is now about 10:1.27 Said one survey respondent, “[After a merger,] 
most of the partners were effectively de-equitized. . . . All this was done 
to increase profits per partner and to consolidate income in a select top 
tier of partners.” 
For complex reasons, probably related in part to lawyers’ exploding 
salary expectations, corporate clients became far more willing to demand 
value and to change firms.28 This made rainmakers much more important. 
As rainmakers’ power increased, the taboo on changing firms 
evaporated.29 The result is the current compensation system, which 
dramatically overvalues “finding,” and dramatically undervalues 
“minding” and “grinding”—that oddly dismissive term for doing high-
quality legal work. 
A 2009 Altman Weil survey of law firm compensation found that 
individual performance factors account for 64% of law firm 
compensation.30 Another 27%, which goes into the bonus distribution 
pool, probably often also goes disproportionately to rainmakers.31 The 
study author concludes: 
That leaves less than 10% weighting to teamwork in practices, 
departments and offices. If the “talk” is collaborative and encouraging 
of team behaviors, then clearly the “walk” of compensation is not 
aligned with those aspirations.32 
 
 23. Id. at 43, 48, 57 n.68. 
 24. See id. at 23–24, 28–29. 
 25. See id. at 52. 
 26. Joel A. Rose, Firms Rethink Partners’ Pay as Leverage Declines, Joel A. Rose & Assocs., 
Inc., http://www.joelarose.com/articles/rethink_partners_pay.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2011). 
 27. Increasing Margins: Experts’ Views of What Works Now with Partner Compensation Plans, 
Partner’s Report for Law Firm Owners, June 2005, at 1, 13 (on file with the Author). 
 28. Galanter & Palay, supra note 21, at 48–50. 
 29. See Burk & McGowan, supra note 10, at 10–11. 
 30. James D. Cotterman, Law Firm Compensation Practices Update, Rep. to Legal Mgmt., 
July/Aug. 2009, at 1, 9 (Altman Weil, Inc.). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
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Consultants wax purple on the perverse incentives built into the 
current system. Overvaluation of billable hours leads to the hoarding of 
work, with the consequent failure to match work to the attorney (a) with 
the relevant skill set, who (b) can deliver a high-quality product in the 
most cost-efficient fashion.33 Overvaluation of rainmaking also leads to 
dissatisfaction among attorneys—men as well as women—who keep the 
clients happy, both through relationship-building and by providing high-
quality legal work.34 Lost in the shuffle, too, are the tasks that new larger 
law firms need to survive and thrive as institutions. As consultants have 
identified, law firms undervalue both teamwork and the kinds of 
institutional investments that are vital to the long-term viability of any 
business organization. 
This Article combines a review of these studies and the existing 
literature on attorney compensation with extensive research into 
experimental studies of gender bias in order to discuss the results of the 
Survey of Women Partners. The survey was administered from July 13, 
2009 to November 22, 2009 and was completed by 694 respondents. 
Fourteen percent of respondents were racial or ethnic minorities. Among 
our minority-partner respondents, 53% were equity partners, while 43% 
were income partners.35 Generally, minority equity and minority income 
partners’ responses will be reported separately. However, the responses 
for both groups are aggregated in instances where there is no significant 
difference between the two, or when the numbers for any one response 
category are so small (less than ten) as to compromise the anonymity of 
the respondents. Our sample is overwhelmingly female: 99% of equity- 
and income-partner respondents and 97% of minority respondents were 
women. This stemmed from a deliberate decision, due to budgetary 
constraints, to limit our outreach to women. The result is that we can 
draw conclusions, based on our data, about what women report, but we 
cannot compare women’s impressions with those of men. An important 
point is that, to avoid awkwardness in the text, we have generally 
referred to “equity partners,” rather than using more precise 
formulations, such as “women equity-partner respondents.” Yet all of 
the survey data here represents findings about women lawyers, not the 
larger universe of lawyers. 
Our survey respondents were more likely than lawyers in general 
are to be in large law firms: Roughly three-fourths of our respondents 
 
 33. Id.; see James D. Cotterman, Examining Your Compensation System, Rep. to Legal Mgmt., 
Apr. 2003, at 1, 5–6 (Altman Weil, Inc.). 
 34. Cotterman, supra note 30; see Cotterman, supra note 33. 
 35. Ninety-four respondents reported being a racial or ethnic minority. Of these respondents, 
thirty-six indicated being equity partners, and twenty-nine indicated being income partners. The 
survey instrument did not define the terms “income partner” and “equity partner.” Respondents were 
left to make their own interpretations of the terms—which can differ between firms. 
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were in firms of over 250 attorneys, as compared with 26.4% of lawyers 
in the U.S. who are in private practice.36 Fifteen percent of our 
respondents were in medium-sized firms (defined as 100 to 250 
attorneys). Our sample was less likely than U.S. lawyers in general to 
work in small firms of one-to-five attorneys: Only 4% worked in firms of 
ten or fewer attorneys. 
Our respondents also were less likely than were U.S. lawyers in 
general to be in very small firms of five lawyers or less. Overall, the 
majority of the sample was in multipractice and litigation firms (86%). 
Majority equity-partner respondents (91%) were more likely than 
majority income partners (81%) or minority equity partners (86%) to be 
in multipractice and litigation firms. Minority income partners were least 
likely to be in multipractice and litigation firms (69%). Although 
litigation-only firms were represented by only 4% of the sample, 
minority partners (7%) were more likely than majority equity (3%) or 
income partners (5%) to be in firms that do only litigation. Majority 
equity partners (6%) were less likely than majority income (13%) and 
minority (12%) partners to be in boutique firms with specialty practices. 
Our income-partner respondents were about as likely as equity 
partners to be in law firms whose footprints are regional; they were more 
likely to be in national firms, and less likely to be in international ones. 
Minority partners were more likely than partners in general to be in 
firms with international footprints, slightly more likely to be at regional 
firms, and less likely to be in national firms.37  
The Article first documents the major findings of the Survey of 
Women Partners, beginning with a discussion of who composes the 
committees that make compensation decisions at most firms—
committees that respondents’ found to lack diversity. Next it provides 
the survey results on respondents’ overall satisfaction with existing 
compensation systems, noting that fewer than half of equity partners and 
only about one-third of income and minority partners report being 
satisfied with their compensation systems. The Article then identifies the 
factors that are perceived to be important—and not important—in 
setting law firm compensation, raising issues of lack of transparency, gaps 
between policy and practice, and problematic measures of personal 
“partner productivity” (in other words, billable hours, cash flow metrics, 
committee ratings, and institutional investment). The Article then 
addresses the issue of origination credit,38 including how it is allocated 
 
 36. See Gita Z. Wilder, NALP Found. for Law Career Research & Educ., Women in the 
Profession: Findings from the First Wave of the After the JD Study 9 (2007). 
 37. See infra Appendix. 
 38. The term “origination” or “origination credit” generally refers to the credit toward 
compensation that a lawyer receives for bringing a client or new business into the firm. See, e.g., James 
D. Cotterman, Recognizing Origination, Rep. to Legal Mgmt., Nov./Dec. 2009, at 1, 8 (Altman Weil, 
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and how disputes over origination can be painful. After identifying 
findings that discount the assumption that compensation is tied to 
women having less time for rainmaking, the Article presents additional 
issues in compensation systems that lead to gender inequity, including 
lack of succession planning, subjectivity, the impact of self-advocacy on 
women, and the concept of de-equitized partners. 
The Article then moves on to address possible solutions in light of 
the study’s findings. It first identifies the economic realities upon which 
any law firm compensation system must be grounded, and then 
concludes by providing nine concrete best practices that can foster 
greater gender equality in law firm compensation. 
I.  Findings 
This study’s findings address the overall satisfaction of women 
partners, minority and majority, and establish a significant correlative 
relationship between partner satisfaction, the understanding of how a 
firm determines compensation, the billable hours threshold, and the 
allocation of origination credit. The level of subjectivity inherent in the 
compensation system also factors into partner success and satisfaction 
and serves as an indicator of the potential for gender bias to be present in 
the system. 
A. Who Makes Compensation Decisions? 
The inner circle of white male lawyers, whether they bring in business 
or not, generally do much better in the firm compensation system than 
the female lawyers. 
A key factor in assessing the gender gap in law firm compensation is 
that law firm partnership ranks remain overwhelming male. In 2009, only 
16% of equity partners and 27% of income partners were women, 
despite the fact that over 30% of law school graduates have been women 
since 1980, and that as of 2000, one-half were women.39 The 
underrepresentation of women among law firm equity partners has a 
profound influence on compensation decisionmaking. The most obvious 
influence concerns who makes the compensation decisions. 
Respondents were asked to list all parties who play a role in setting 
compensation at their firms. Little difference emerged among the 
different groups of respondents.40 The most common answer (39-40%) 
was that a management or executive committee made overall 
compensation decisions, as well as decisions regarding the salaries of 
 
Inc.). 
 39. NAWL, 2009 Report, supra note 9, at 7. 
 40. No difference was noted from the disaggregation of minority respondents into income and 
equity partners. 
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income partners (35-40%), the compensation of equity partners (40-
42%), and whether bonuses are distributed and who gets them (37-39%). 
Next most common (22-27%) were systems where a separate 
compensation committee determined overall compensation levels as well 
as the compensation of income and equity partners, with compensation 
committees being the most likely to set the compensation of income 
partners (27%) but less likely to set the compensation of equity and 
minority partners (22-23%). 
Nearly as many respondents said that the managing partner, chair or 
president set overall compensation levels at their firms, although 
considerably fewer income (14%) than equity partners (19-20%) reported 
this system. 
Practice group leaders played a role in setting income, draws, and 
bonuses at 12% or less of our respondents’ firms. Partner vote played a 
role in 7% or less of respondents’ firms. 
The committees that decide compensation tended to have between 
five and ten members, although some had thirty-one or more members. 
Membership on the compensation or other key committee was most 
commonly determined by election by the partnership: 34% of equity 
partners and 23% of income partners reported this kind of system. The 
next most common system was appointment by the chair or equivalent, 
reported by 28% of equity partners and 23% of income partners. Next 
most common were systems that included a combination of elected and 
appointed members, reported by 14% of equity partners, and 17% of 
income partners. Comments on the surveys indicated that, in some firms, 
elections are pro forma, in that a preselected panel is typically or 
invariably elected. 
The only major difference between women minority and majority 
partners was that minority partners were considerably more likely to be 
in firms in which compensation decisions were made by a combination of 
elected and appointed committee members: 26% of minority partners 
were, as compared to 14% of equity and 17% of income partners. 
In addition, minority representation on the committee in charge of 
compensation often was low or nonexistent. As shown in Figure 1, the 
compensation committee had no minority women in nearly 90% of 
majority respondents’ firms and in nearly 80% of minority respondents’ 
firms. Compensation committees had no minority men in roughly 75% of 
minority respondents’ firms, and 71% of majority respondents’ firms. 
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Figure 1: Compensation Committee Composition: Numbers of Minority 
Women and Minority Men by Minority Status of Partner 
Representation of women on compensation committees also was 
low. About half of respondents had one woman on their compensation 
committees. One-fifth had none. Another fifth had two women on their 
compensation committees, as shown in Figure 2. Said one respondent, 
“We have only one woman on our management committee, and one 
woman group head—which is disturbing.” Three respondents disclosed 
that they serve on their firms’ compensation committees. Research shows 
that one woman serving on a committee of men can give rise to tokenism 
dynamics that negatively affect both the woman herself and her ability to 
influence decisionmaking.41 Minority partners were slightly more likely to 
be at firms with no women on their compensation committees and were 
slightly less likely to be at firms with one woman on their committees. 
Figure 2: Compensation Committee Composition: Majority Women by 
Minority Status of Partner 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Out lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgendered lawyers also are rare on 
compensation committees, as shown in Figure 3. 
 
 41. Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Men and Women of the Corporation 238–39 (1993). 
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Figure 3: Compensation Committee Composition: Number LBGT by 
Minority Status of Partner 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In short, our respondents’ perception was that, at many firms, the 
committees that decide law firm compensation often are startlingly 
lacking in diversity. Data on law firm committee assignments suggests 
that powerful compensation and management committees are much 
more likely to be staffed by men. NAWL’s Fourth Annual Survey on 
Retention and Promotion of Women reports that “about 14% of the 
nation’s largest firms have no women at all on their governing 
committees.”42 The average percentage of female members on the largest 
firms’ governing committees has not changed substantially in the last 
four years.43 
Equity partners reported that compensation or executive committees 
were most likely to have responsibility for compensation decisions (38-
42%), with special compensation committees (20-23%) and firm leaders 
(19-21%) roughly half as likely to play a role. Income partners were 
slightly more likely than equity partners to report participation by a 
special compensation committee (26-29%) and slightly less likely to 
report participation by firm leaders (14-16%). Among minority 
attorneys, firm leaders were more likely (17-21%) and the management 
or executive committee was less likely (35-40%) to play a role in 
compensation.44 
Having practice group leaders involved in compensation decisions 
was a much less common practice: 8-12% of equity partners, 7-14% of 
 
 42. NAWL, 2009 Report, supra note 9, at 2. 
 43. Id. at 5; see also Laura R. Hammargren, Comment, Servant Leadership and Women in the 
Law: A New Nexus of Women, Leadership and the Legal Profession, 4 U. St. Thomas L.J. 624, 634 
(2007) (“[D]espite women’s equal parity in law school and entrance to the profession, gender 
composition at law firms has remained 70% male since 1997 and leadership percentages are even 
worse. The most compelling number reflecting the stagnancy of women advancement is the 18% of 
women equity partners that did not grow or expand from 2000 to 2005.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 44. No difference was noted from the disaggregation of minority income and minority equity 
partners. 
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income partners, and 8-10% of minority partners reported involvement 
of practice group leaders in setting bonuses and the salaries of income 
partners. Practice group leaders were very rarely involved in setting the 
compensation of equity partners. 
The demographics of law firm partnerships, and of the committees 
and individuals in charge of compensation, pave the way for a pattern 
called in-group favoritism.45 In-group favoritism flips the common image 
that gender bias discriminates against women. In-group favoritism is a 
potentially powerful form of bias that discriminates in favor of men. In-
group favoritism tends to be strongest when men greatly outnumber 
women, because then gender is salient—it jumps out as unavoidably 
apparent. In addition, subjective and highly discretionary decisionmaking, 
which describes most law firm compensation systems, can exacerbate in-
group favoritism.46 
People automatically prefer people like them.47 They feel more 
comfortable with them, more obligated to them, more loyal to them. 
They impute positive attributes,48 trust them, remember their positive 
traits while forgetting their negative ones, and favor them in distributing 
rewards.49 When men are the in-group, men—but not women—tend to be 
given the benefit of the doubt. Objective rules tend to be applied rigidly 
to women but leniently to men.50 
 
 45. Robin J. Ely, The Power in Demography: Women’s Social Constructions of Gender Identity at 
Work, 38 Acad. Mgmt. J. 589, 625 (1995) (“In firms in which few women were in positions of power, 
sex roles were more stereotypical and more problematic. Women in these firms, when compared to 
women in firms with higher proportions of senior women, . . . evaluated feminine attributes . . . less 
favorably in relation to their firm’s requirements for success . . . .”); see also Paul R. Sackett et al., 
Tokenism in Performance Evaluation: The Effects of Work Group Representation on Male-Female and 
White-Black Differences in Performance Ratings, 76 J. Applied Psychol. 263, 266 (1991) (“[W]omen 
are rated about half a standard deviation lower than men when women make up less than 20% of the 
group. When women make up more than 50% of the work group, they are in fact rated more highly 
than men.”).  
 46. See William T. Bielby, Minimizing Workplace Gender and Racial Bias, 29 Contemp. Soc. 120, 
123 (2000) (“[P]ersonnel systems whose criteria for making decisions are arbitrary and subjective are 
highly vulnerable to bias due to the influence of stereotypes . . . . A high degree of segregation in such 
a system is usually a strong indicator that ascriptive traits are strongly influencing personnel 
decisions . . . .” (internal citation omitted)); Daniel J. Brass, Men’s and Women’s Networks: A Study of 
Interaction Patterns and Influence in an Organization, 28 Acad. Mgmt. J. 327, 339–40 (1985) (“Men 
and women appeared to build networks equally well, although each gender tended to interact with 
itself. . . . The result of this segregation was that women were less central to men’s networks, in 
particular the interaction network of the dominant coalition. Access to this group of high-level men 
was very strongly related to influence for the women employees and was significantly related to 
promotions for the entire sample.”). 
 47. James N. Baron & Jeffrey Pfeffer, The Social Psychology of Organizations and Inequality, 
57 Soc. Psychol. Q. 190, 192 (1994). 
 48. Charles W. Perdue et al., Us and Them: Social Categorization and the Process of Intergroup 
Bias, 59 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 475, 478 (1990) (“In-group words demonstrated the potential 
to imbue neutral stimuli with positive connotation by simply being concurrently presented.”). 
 49. Baron & Pfeffer, supra note 47, at 192, 198. 
 50. See, e.g., id. at 198–99 (“The available evidence is quite clear that work performed by women 
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In-group favoritism does not mean that all men are in the in-group. 
In a typical law firm, the pattern instead means that, although some men 
are excluded from the in-group, most members of the in-group are white 
men. Said one respondent, who commented that it helps to know and be 
known. “White men seem to fare best on this, but not all white men do 
well—but of people who do well, almost all (maybe all) are white men.” 
Some respondents expressed a high opinion of those committees’ 
work. Said one, “I think the compensation committee works very hard, 
makes tough decisions equitably and tried to do the right thing.” Yet 
floods of comments by other respondents demonstrated the effects of in-
group favoritism when asked what factors played an important role in 
their compensation systems: 
• “Anomalies are visible in the firm’s compensation patterns. Most 
partners attribute this to whether you are in the chairman’s inner 
circle or not.” 
• “Partners who have the support of powerful partners are [more highly] 
compensated than other partners with the same metrics.” 
• “Being part of the ‘in crowd.’” 
• “Personal relationships with power partners.” 
• “If a powerful partner cares about your compensation.” 
• “Seniority plays no role but having a cheerleader, particularly if that 
cheerleader sits on the management committee, can play a huge role.” 
• “Whether you are supported, well liked, etc. by partners with 
significant clout.” 
• “Although the starting point of the discussions is an objective one, 
subjective judgment of the senior management plays a huge 
role . . . . It is staggering how two partners who are similarly situated 
on paper can end up in very different organizational tiers, and how 
people in the same tier can be incomparable on paper. Political 
relationships and history with the firm are significant, although 
unspoken, factors.” 
• “It is primarily based on client base and billings but the firm also 
considers contribution to firm operations and management and other 
subjective factors, such as whether one of the partners on the 
compensation committee personally supports or favors you.” 
Some respondents felt that members of the relevant committee took care 
of themselves: “Somehow members of the Executive Committee (who 
make the decisions) and the Practice Group Leaders seem to be the most 
 
is valued less highly than comparable work done by men.”); Marilynn B. Brewer, The Social 
Psychology of Intergroup Relations: Can Research Inform Practice?, 53 J. Soc. Issues 197, 205 (1997) 
(“[W]e-they distinctions . . . produce differential evaluation, liking, and treatment of other persons 
depending on whether they are identified as members of the ingroup category or not.”); Marilynn 
Brewer & Rupert J. Brown, Intergroup Relations, in 2 Handbook of Social Psychology 554, 554 
(Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske & Gardner Lindzey eds., 1998); Perdue et al., supra note 48, at 482 
(“Our three experiments indicated that . . . “us” and “them,” together with other collective pronouns, 
may perpetuate and possibly transfer in-group-related biases to evaluations of other people.”). 
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highly compensated and seldom lose ground . . . during their tenure on 
the Committee.” Another respondent noted that being in the in-group 
not only translated directly into higher compensation, but also paved the 
way to management positions that could do so: 
• “Being a friend of managing partners seems to translate into higher 
compensation. It also leads to management positions, which can be 
leveraged into higher compensation.” 
• “The problem with the questions is that some of these criteria 
are . . . relied on by the management to reward themselves and those 
they want to reward, but not others.” 
In an environment where women and people of color are 
underrepresented, both among partners and on the committees that 
make compensation decisions, in-group favoritism opens the door to 
gender and race bias. Again, comments abound: 
• “Getting someone from the 97% male group that really runs the firm 
to advocate for you.” 
• “It’s mostly a ‘good old boy’ system.” 
• “When you see the distribution of compensation among partners, it 
has the appearance of a solid old boys’ network.” 
• “Also includes total hours and subjective criteria and old boy 
relationships.” 
• “As an unwritten principle, whether you are one of the ‘boys.’” 
• “I was the highest paid woman in my office, and my compensation was 
about 50% less than any . . . male partner in my department in my 
office. There was significant backlash as a result of my sexual 
orientation internally.” 
Extensive literature documents what everyone knows: People tend to 
associate with people like them. This is not news, but if job benefits are 
then distributed through males’ network ties, gender bias can appear.51 In 
addition, in a context where decisionmaking involves secrecy and 
complex sets of often countervailing factors, in-group favoritism is more 
likely to have an influence.52 
Sometimes gender creeps in not only because law firms are 
predominantly male, but also because more senior attorneys are. A few 
respondents expressed sentiments to the effect that “senior partners 
were compensat[ed] unfairly vis-à-vis junior partners.” One added, “Of 
course, this is a gender concern as well because there are far fewer senior 
women partners.” 
 
 51. For a review of the literature on how gender shapes workplace networks, see Gail M. 
McGuire, Gender, Race, and the Shadow Structure: A Study of Informal Networks and Inequality in a 
Work Organization, 16 Gender & Soc’y 303 (2002). 
 52. See, e.g., Gerald R. Salancik & Jeffrey Pfeffer, Uncertainty, Secrecy, and the Choice of Similar 
Others, 41 Soc. Psychol. 246, 246 (1978) (discussing how secrecy and conflicting criteria tend to fuel 
in-group favoritism). 
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Another respondent identified not only male networks, but also 
masculine assumptions and ideals as being disadvantageous to women: 
“Origination is skewed by (1) historical firm client control (typically 
male), (2) individual partner generosity or lack of [the] same in 
attributing origination to others when multiple efforts have gone into 
attracting and keeping a client (more powerful partners (usually male) 
may claim origination without challenge from others). The final piece 
of compensation is entirely subjective—board’s discretion to consider 
special circumstances deserving additional comp—male dominated 
ideas of measuring value and what is ‘special.’” 
Some respondents felt their firms crossed the line into outright gender 
discrimination: 
• “Pure gender—women are paid less, period, although management 
would deny this.” 
• “Law firm compensation at most firms in the AmLaw [American 
Lawyer] Top 50 is a per se violation of [federal law].” 
Other comments do not identify reasons but express their sense that men 
clearly make more than women: 
• “Across the board, men make more than women in the firm’s NYC 
office.” 
• “It is hard to say that gender is not a factor, when the median 
compensation for male partners is almost double that of female 
partners in my department, which is the largest department in a large 
international law firm. Once bonuses (which are confidential) are 
factored in, it is my informed belief that women partners in my 
practice group make less than half as much as the male partners.” 
• “I do not believe the firm could withstand a fairness audit that applied 
more objective criteria to compensation. We will never know, but 
most women partners believe their compensation is less than male 
counterparts’.” 
• “Attorneys who put in many hours or bring in an important case are 
typically awarded bonuses. However, the firm has discriminated and 
used bonuses to pay certain women and gay men so that they do not 
have to increase the ‘base compensation’ of the partner. This is 
important because the partnership agreement provides that a partner’s 
comp cannot drop more than 25% per year. By awarding bonuses 
instead of additional comp, the firm does not have to commit to 
paying a high salary next year. The bonus was used in such a 
discriminatory way one year that a woman partner filed a claim 
against the firm, arbitrated it (won), and left the firm.” 
At some firms, problems surrounding compensation appear to be part of 
a larger problem. Said one respondent: 
“At this firm, women are almost never asked to go on a pitch unless it 
is to a female. We also get no referrals from male attorneys other than 
the men we worked with at our previous firm who moved with us to 
this firm. I have had to tell men not to call me ‘dear’ and ‘kiddo’ and 
they have been insulted by that. And our compensation and bonuses 
are clearly not the same.” 
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B. Overall Satisfaction 
Somewhat under half (47%) of equity-partner respondents were 
satisfied or extremely satisfied with their annual compensation in relation 
to their partner peers, as compared with approximately 35% of income 
partners.53 Among minority attorneys, approximately equal proportions 
indicated they were “satisfied” or “extremely satisfied” as those who 
indicated they were “dissatisfied” or “extremely dissatisfied” (36% and 
37%, respectively). Majority equity partners were considerably more likely 
than were majority income partners and minority partners to be “satisfied” 
or “extremely satisfied.” Conversely, majority equity partners are less 
likely to indicate dissatisfaction or extreme dissatisfaction than were 
income partners and minority partners. 
Table 1: Are You Satisfied with Your Annual Compensation in 
Relation to Your PARTNER PEERS? 
 Majority 
Equity 
Partners 
Majority 
Income 
Partners 
Minority 
Partners 
1. Satisfied or 
extremely satisfied  
50% 39% 36% 
2. Dissatisfied or 
extremely dissatisfied  
31% 38% 37% 
 
Equity-partner respondents were about as likely to be “satisfied” or 
“extremely satisfied” with their bonuses as they were with their 
compensation (48%).54 They were less likely (27%) to be “dissatisfied” or 
“extremely dissatisfied” (as opposed to “mixed” or “neutral”). Minority 
partners were less likely to be “satisfied” or “extremely satisfied” (34%) 
with their bonuses than they were with their compensation. Minority 
partners were near equally balanced between those who were “satisfied” 
or “extremely satisfied” (34%) and those who were “dissatisfied” or 
“extremely dissatisfied” (33%), reflecting the fact that minority-partner 
respondents were about equally split between income and equity partners. 
These satisfaction rates with the frequency and/or amounts of their 
bonuses were about the same as their satisfaction rates with their overall 
compensation.55 Among majority respondents, only 27% of income 
partners were “satisfied” or “extremely satisfied” with their bonus 
amounts, whereas 51% of equity partners were “satisfied” or “extremely 
satisfied.” 
 
 53. This data is not reflected in Table 1 infra. 
 54. This data is not reflected in Table 1 supra. 
 55. See supra note 55. 
Williams_62-HLJ-597 (Do Not Delete) 4/21/2011 12:19 PM 
614 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:597 
Respondents were less sanguine that their compensation systems 
were applied consistently from year to year. Equity partners had more 
confidence about this than did the other two groups: About one-third were 
“satisfied” or “extremely satisfied.” The two other groups were distinctly 
dubious: Only about one in four minority (25%) and income partners 
(26%) reported being “satisfied” or “extremely satisfied” about year-to-
year consistency. Among majority respondents, a greater proportion of 
equity partners than income partners were “satisfied” or “extremely 
satisfied” that their compensation system is applied consistently (40% and 
30%, respectively). 
Table 2: Are You “Satisfied” or “Extremely Satisfied” That Your 
Compensation System Is Applied Consistently from YEAR TO YEAR? 
 
Majority 
Equity Partners 
Majority 
Income 
Partners 
Minority 
Partners 
1. Satisfied or 
extremely satisfied  
40% 30% 25% 
2. Dissatisfied or 
extremely 
dissatisfied  
38% 42% 51% 
 
Satisfaction levels fell again when respondents were asked about 
satisfaction that their firms’ compensation systems were applied 
consistently from partner to partner. About one in three equity partners 
were satisfied or extremely satisfied, as compared to one in five income 
partners and one in four minority partners. Once again, minority 
partners looked more like income than equity partners. 
Table 3: Are You “Satisfied” or “Extremely Satisfied” That Your 
Compensation System Is Applied Consistently from PARTNER TO 
PARTNER? 
 
Majority Equity 
Partners 
Majority 
Income 
Partners 
Minority 
Partners 
1. Satisfied or 
extremely satisfied  
36% 24% 22% 
2. Dissatisfied or 
extremely 
dissatisfied  
45% 54% 56% 
 
In summary, about half of the equity-partner respondents were 
satisfied or extremely satisfied with their compensation and bonuses, 
while only one-in-three was satisfied or extremely satisfied that their 
compensation systems were applied consistently from year to year and 
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from one partner to the next. Not surprisingly, income partners were less 
likely to be satisfied or extremely satisfied than were equity partners. 
Unfortunately, in this exploratory study we are not able to compare 
these levels of satisfaction with the satisfaction rates of male partners. 
However, the finding that between 35% and 44% of respondents were 
satisfied or extremely satisfied with their compensation is lower than that 
of the Reichman and Sterling study, which found that 51% of women but 
71% of male lawyers reported high levels of satisfaction with their 
compensation systems.56 This is not surprising, given that the earlier study 
assessed the satisfaction of law firm associates as well as partners during 
an era when most law firms paid associates in lockstep. This meant that 
the women associates typically were getting the same compensation as 
the men, which would naturally create a situation in which women 
associates were more satisfied with their compensation systems than 
were women partners. 
Our data also allow us to draw some conclusions about racial 
differences in satisfaction rates among women law firm partners. 
Although slightly over half of the minority-partner respondents (55%) 
were equity partners, the minority-partner respondents were far closer to 
income partners than to equity partners in terms of their overall 
satisfaction with their firms’ compensation systems, and with their firms’ 
compensation systems’ consistency from partner to partner and from 
year to year than were partners in general. This racial difference in 
satisfaction rates is an important finding, although further study is 
needed to ascertain whether this pattern holds among men. 
C. What Factors Are Important in Setting Law Firm Compensation? 
The firm gives lip service, when evaluating for compensation, to firm 
management activities, committee work, participation in non-billable 
events, but it seems they are unevenly applied in order to justify the 
subjective whims of the evaluators . . . . Management activities are not 
compensated for; leadership is not, mentoring is not, and attorneys 
who are good billers, but do poorly in these areas, or are destructive 
factors, are nonetheless rewarded without any effort at correction. 
Huge majorities of our respondents did not believe that their firms 
take into account the right combination of factors when determining 
compensation. Only about one in three equity partners (32%), one in six 
income partners (16%), and slightly less than one in six minority partners 
(15%) were satisfied or extremely satisfied that their firms’ compensation 
systems recognized the right combination of individual partner 
contributions. Of course, some respondents showed confidence that their 
firms took into account a wide variety of factors and seemed content 
overall. Some examples: 
 
 56. Reichman & Sterling, supra note 5, at 46–47. 
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• “Subjective factors play a significant role, e.g. participation in 
management, civic and pro bono activities, etc. Being a team player, 
cross-selling to other groups, business development efforts and being a 
mentor are non-objective factors that are considered.” 
• “Contribution to firm administrative, client development, trainings 
and other non-billable activities is taken into consideration during the 
compensation process.” 
Very few respondents had true lockstep systems: Only two equity 
partners reported such a system. By far, the most common system 
reported by our respondents was one in which partner compensation is 
based “on the partner’s own client base and total billings or collection for 
that client base.” Nearly half (47%) of equity partners reported this type 
of system. This percentage is dramatically higher than what management 
consultants have found: They find such “eat what you kill” systems 
confined to small firms, with few such systems surviving beyond the 
founding generation of partners.57 The likely explanation is that 
respondents felt that although firms’ systems were not formally “eat what 
you kill,” in practice, they place so much value on originations, partners’ 
billable hours, and revenue collected that they operated much like one. 
The next most common (37%) system reported by equity partners was 
an objective system with various factors taken into account. Very few 
equity-partner respondents (less than 1%) reported a true lockstep 
system: This system—once widespread—has nearly been eliminated,58 
although at least one respondent felt strongly that women fared far 
better under her firm’s lockstep system than under alternative types of 
systems. However, 20% of equity-partner respondents reported that 
seniority was one factor considered in setting compensation. Only 19% 
reported totally subjective systems, which comes as no surprise. Small 
firms are much more likely than large ones to have totally subjective 
systems, and the respondents tended to come from larger law firms.59 
While some firms are explicit about the weighting of factors that 
play a role in partner compensation, many are not. Many provide only a 
long list of factors without much information about how the different 
factors are weighted. Feelings were mixed about how different factors 
are weighted in the setting of law firm compensation. Some of the 
comments received were upbeat with respect to the factors taken into 
account by their compensation systems: 
• “Our focus is to take a qualitative look at a partner’s contribution and 
fairly compensate everyone.” 
 
 57. Personal Communication with Blane Prescott, Hildebrandt Baker Robbins International Inc., 
(Dec. 3, 2008) (on file with Author). 
 58. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.  
 59. Personal Communication with Blane Prescott, supra note 57. 
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• “My firm does stress teamwork and the value of putting the interests 
of the firm ahead of individual interests.” 
• “Excellence, collegiality.” 
• “Willingness to undertake firm projects; ability to work effectively in a 
team-based environment.” 
• “Quality of work, efficiency.” 
• “Overall reputation for excellence of the partner.” 
• “The firm considers a combination of business generation, fees 
received on time, and matter management as objective statistics and 
then look to the subjective factors such as team work, service to the 
firm, cross selling etc.” 
• “External profile and visibility.” 
Ironically, only a few comments explicitly mentioned excellent legal 
work as a factor that affects compensation. A rare example identified a 
“[m]ix of objective/subjective” factors, with the “[s]ubjective based on 
legal skills, teamwork, and client relationships.” 
1. Transparency 
A surprising number of respondents did not know what factors drive 
compensation at their firms. Said one respondent, frankly, “I have no 
idea what the factors are.” Others knew what factors count, but not how 
those factors are weighted: “The method, we are told, considers objective 
factors like client billings and billable hours. However, there are other 
factors, such as mentoring, collaboration etc. that are considered. There 
is no way to know how these factors are weighed or even quantified.” 
Many respondents felt that their firm’s compensation systems lacked 
transparency. Only slightly more than one-third (37%) of equity 
partners, one-fifth (22%) of income partners, and one-fifth (23%) of 
minority partners reported that the criteria the firms use to determine 
partnership levels are clear or extremely clear. Slightly higher 
proportions of majority respondents found the criteria clear or extremely 
clear: 39% of equity partners and 25% of income partners. When 
information about organizational systems is not transparent, in-group 
favoritism can have a profound effect on who gets access to the necessary 
information through their informal networks. 
• “I have no idea how partner compensation is determined. You should 
have a ‘no clue’ option in this survey.” 
• “Completing this survey is difficult because the process is not completely 
transparent or understood, although efforts are being made to 
improve[] in this respect.” 
 Surprising numbers of respondents reported that they were not clear 
about how their firms’ compensation system works. Only 60% of equity 
partners, 30% of income partners, and 34% of minority partners 
reported that they were clear or extremely clear about this crucial 
information. Sixty-four percent of majority equity partners and 33% of 
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majority income partners were clear or extremely clear on this. The 
finding that law firm compensation systems lack transparency confirms 
the findings of the Reichman and Sterling study, which quotes an income 
partner: 
There is this mysterious, quote, formula for setting your compensation, 
but no matter how hard you work in any given year you never share in 
the upside of that year. You may be rewarded in the next year, and you 
may not. You share in all the downsides. . . . So you’re taking it in the 
shorts at both ends.60 
Lack of information affects some equity partners as well. One survey 
respondent, in a firm with a closed compensation system, reported the 
sense that women partners were not informed about the necessary 
criteria for elevation in the partnership ranks. A “closed system” is a 
system in which individual partners do not know how much their partners 
make: This information is limited to members of the compensation 
committee, or other committee that decides compensation. 
One positive comment highlighted the importance of transparency—
even in a firm with a closed compensation system: “I think this is the best 
managed law firm anywhere, and that’s because compensation is done in 
a fair way—notwithstanding the closed system—transparent to the 
individual.” 
2. Gap Between Policy and Practice: What Really Counts? 
Many respondents felt a disconnect between the factors their firms 
said they considered and what factors actually influenced compensation. 
Few people had data: One would need to do a regression analysis to 
ascertain which factors actually play an important role in the setting of 
compensation in an individual firm.61 “A regression analysis by a 
McKinsey-trained woman senior manager showed that the most 
dominant factor in setting compensation is origination credit,” noted one 
respondent. Many others noted a gap between policy and practice: 
• “Theoretically, subjective factors are taken into account, but in truth, 
we are only compensated for the amount billed and the number of 
hours we work.” 
• “There is a complete disconnect between what my firm says it values 
and how the compensation system is then set up. We pay all kinds of 
lip-service to diversity, associate training and mentoring, recruiting, 
etc., but when it comes to compensation the only thing that matters is 
whether you brought in the business and billed a lot of hours.” 
• “I checked not important for pro bono/community service and bar 
association activities because while people are encouraged to 
participate, their compensation suffers if their revenue hours slip so 
that they can do these types of activities.” 
 
 60. Reichman & Sterling, supra note 5, at 44. 
 61. Cotterman, supra note 30, at 3–4. 
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• “Where I indicated ‘not important,’ most of these items the Firm 
would say it considers as important, but the compensation does not 
appear to reflect that.” 
Consultants also have noted a gap between policy and practice. Joel 
A. Rose warns that “[t]ensions can develop when the direction of firm’s 
compensation system is unclear or receives only lip service.”62 He cites 
three examples: (1) when a firm encourages partners to delegate work 
but “overcompensates for revenue collected from partners’” own billable 
hours rather than delegation, (2) when a firm encourages joint business 
development but tends not to split origination credit, and (3) when a firm 
encourages partners to do important nonbillable work, such as marketing, 
training, and so on, but “rewards those activities marginally in favor of 
billable hours/revenue” collected.63 A key arena in which a gap yawns 
between policy and practice concerns the types of factors that actually 
influence compensation, as opposed to the factors that firms list as 
relevant, but which in fact rarely have a significant impact.64  
3. “Personal Productivity”65 
The number of hours a partner bills personally is often referred to 
as “partner productivity.” Yet, as will be discussed below, rewarding 
partners for working as many hours as humanly possible is not 
necessarily a good business model. A most-hours-wins system tends to 
disadvantage women, because it favors law firm partners who have a 
specific family form that most male law firm partners, but few women 
law firms partners, have: the “two-person career.” A lawyer with a two-
person career has the advantage of a spouse who takes care of most, or 
all, of the lawyer’s nonwork responsibilities, from waiting for the cable 
repairman to picking up the dry cleaning to caring for children and 
elders.66 Lawyers with two-person careers have an advantage over both 
mothers and single women, as noted by one African-American attorney 
quoted in Visible Invisibility: 
The male associates all had stay-at-home wives who took care of all the 
everyday things. Even if they didn’t have children, their dry cleaning 
was picked up, their dinner was cooked, their house was cleaned. And 
women have to do all that stuff on top of their work.67 
 
 62. Joel A. Rose, Hallmarks of a Well-Conceived Partner Compensation System, IOMA’s Rep. on 
Compensation & Benefits for L. Off., Dec. 2010, at 1, 3. 
 63. Id. at 3–4. 
 64. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 65. James D. Cotterman, Making Better Compensation Decisions, Rep. to Legal Mgmt., Apr. 
2006, at 4, 5 (Altman Weil, Inc.) (“The performance factor that most highly correlates with lawyer 
compensation is personal productivity as measured by fees collected.”). 
 66. Hannah Papanek, Men, Women, and Work: Reflections on the Two-Person Career, 78 Am. J. 
Soc. 852, 860 (1973). 
 67. Janet E. Gans Epner, ABA Comm’n on Women in the Prof., Visible Invisibility: Women 
of Color in Law Firms 33 (2006). 
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Our sample reflects these nationwide trends: 69% of equity-partner 
respondents (virtually all women) had a spouse or partner who worked 
full time for pay. Only 10% had spouses or partners who worked only 
part time, and only 15% had partners who were home full time. Prior 
studies show that about half of male attorneys have wives at home full 
time.68 
Taking a closer look at the women who had partners at home full 
time, we found that 17% were majority equity partners, 14% were 
majority non-equity partners, and 7% were minority partners. In keeping 
with national trends, roughly 70% of each group of partners we surveyed 
had a spouse or partner who worked full time for pay: 69% of equity 
partners, 70% of income partners. However, a comparison by minority-
majority status of the partners reveals that a larger proportion of 
minority partners have a spouse or partner who works full time for pay 
relative to majority partners: 79% minority income partners and 83% 
minority equity partners, as compared to 68% majority income partners 
and 65% majority equity partners. This is consistent with prior research 
that finds women attorneys to be substantially more likely to be married 
to a professional spouse than male attorneys—a trend that has persisted 
since the 1960s.69 
About two-thirds of majority equity- (69%) and minority-partner 
respondents (66%), and a slightly lower percentage of majority income 
partners (59%) had primary or shared care-giving responsibilities for 
children under 18 during their tenure at their current firms.70 In 
professional families with children, mothers tend to find that “the buck 
stops here.” Said one mother in Pamela Stone’s influential study of 
professional women, when describing her husband, “He has always said 
to me, ‘You can do whatever you want to do.’ But he’s not there to pick 
up any load.”71 Stone found that husbands played a role in the decisions 
of two-thirds of the women she interviewed to leave their careers.72 
 
 68. Linda Bray Chanow, The Business Case for Reduced Hours, Project for Att’y Retention, 
http://www.pardc.org/Publications/business_case.shtml (last visited Feb. 2, 2011) (“Nearly half of 
married [male] attorneys have stay-at-home wives.”); see also Betsy Morris, It’s Her Job Too: Lorna 
Wendt’s $20 Million Divorce Case Is the Shot Heard ‘Round the Water Cooler, Fortune, Feb. 2, 1998, 
at 64, 65, available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1998/02/02/237198/ 
index.htm (“[I]n 84% of the marriages in this country both spouses now have jobs. Yet the topmost 
rungs of the corporate and professional American are still heavily populated by ‘traditional’ 
couples.”). 
 69. Kenneth Glenn Dau-Schmidt et al., Gender and the Legal Profession: The Michigan Alumni 
Data Set 1967–2000, at 74 (2008) (unpublished paper) (on file with Indiana University School of 
Law—Bloomington), available at http://works.bepress.com/kenneth_dau_schmidt/1. 
 70. Presumably, some respondents had child care responsibilities at an earlier or a later stage of 
their careers, while others had no children. 
 71. Pamela Stone & Meg Lovejoy, Fast-Track Women and the “Choice” to Stay Home, 596 Am. 
Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 62, 76 (2004). 
 72. Pamela Stone, Opting Out?: Why Women Really Quit Careers and Head Home 62 (2007). 
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Why? Professional men feel under intense pressure to fulfill 
workplace ideals—even if (according to management consultants) those 
ideals place an artificially high value on working as many hours as 
possible.73 Being a good provider still is seen as an integral part of being a 
good father.74 Fathers with childcare responsibilities risk failing to 
perform as an ideal worker75 and, consequently, being seen both as a bad 
father and an inadequate man. Think of everyday language: When 
mothers dream about their daughters marrying a “successful” man, most 
are thinking of his paycheck, not his willingness to wear a baby carrier. 
Said one upper-middle class man, “Let’s face it, most men want to build 
their ego by saying, ‘I’ve made it, I’ve been successful.’ Hell, how do you 
grade that success? You grade it by the amount of money you made.”76 
In short, gender pressures push men towards, and women away 
from, two-person careers. Our respondents likely were affected by these 
patterns, given that, in addition to child care, one in four (25%) equity-
partner respondents and nearly one in six (17%) income-partner 
respondents had primary or shared responsibility for elderly parents or 
grandparents (including in-laws) or other elderly relatives. In keeping 
with other studies, we found that a higher percentage of minority-partner 
respondents—nearly one in three (32%)—had elder care responsibilities. 
This is not big news: As a group, women have more responsibility 
than men for family caregiving. This is why compensation systems that 
confuse an attorney’s work schedule with the attorney’s productivity 
disadvantage women—particularly women with children, but also women 
without them. 
a. Origination and Billable Hours Are King 
“[T]he two most important partner compensation criteria in law 
firms remain the ability to bring in new clients to the firm and to be 
personally productive, as measured by fees collected as a working 
lawyer,” reports James D. Cotterman, a management consultant at 
Altman Weil.77 Blane Prescott, of Hildebrandt Baker Robbins Inc., 
agrees, noting that 80% of partner compensation has historically been 
 
 73. Nicholas W. Townsend, The Package Deal: Marriage, Work and Fatherhood in Men’s 
Lives 125 (2002). 
 74. See, e.g., id. at 53 (discussing the central role that “providing” plays in men’s lives); William 
Marsiglio & Joseph H. Pleck, Fatherhood and Masculinities, in Handbook of Studies on Men and 
Masculinities 249, 260 (Michael S. Kimmel et al., eds., 2005) (“[W]hen men are unemployed or 
underemployed, they often find it difficult to feel good about themselves as fathers because the 
provider role continues to be an important feature of hegemonic images of masculinity and men’s 
fathering experience.” (citation omitted)). 
 75. Joan C. Williams, Reshaping the Work-Family Debate: Why Men and Class Matter 80 
(2010). 
 76. Michèle Lamont, Money, Morals, and Manners: The Culture of the French and the 
American Upper-Middle Class, at xxix (1992). 
 77. Cotterman, supra note 30, at 1. 
Williams_62-HLJ-597 (Do Not Delete) 4/21/2011 12:19 PM 
622 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:597 
based on some combination of origination and productivity.78 Other 
experts also agree.79 
In fact, Cotterman’s regression analyses suggest that origination 
typically is more important than billable hours: He reports that “one can 
explain 80% to 90% of the variability in [equity] partner compensation 
by knowing just one performance metric—origination.”80 
The percentage of compensation determined by origination varies 
from firm to firm: “95% of comp[ensation] is based upon client base and 
billings, and 5% discretionary,” reported one respondent. Comments 
indicate that both origination and billable hours are important in some 
firms, while in other firms, one factor or the other clearly trumps: 
• “Originations and worked collections are all that matters.” 
• “Billable hours, billable hours, billable hours.” 
• “It’s all about originations.” 
Other respondents mentioned different factors, highlighting the variation 
between firms: 
• “Firm really tries hard to do comprehensive evaluation of each 
candidate.” 
• “Ability to carry case management responsibilities start to finish, trial 
abilities.” 
• “What practice area do you belong to and is that an area of growth for 
the Firm.” 
• “Niche practice value.” 
• “We don’t consider billable hours. It’s money in the door. Is there any 
other calculus?” 
• “Partner/associate leverage ratio (keeping at least two associates busy 
full time).” 
Our findings confirm that originations, by client or matter, or by 
revenue collected, and hours worked are—by far—most often listed as 
being among the top factors in setting compensation in the law firms of 
our respondents. The following table lists the top ten factors listed as 
either “important” or “very important” in ranked order. 
 
 78. Email from Blane Prescott to Joan C. Williams (Feb. 14, 2010, 9:38 AM) (on file with 
Author). 
 79. See, e.g., Compensation Decisions Surveyed: Economic Troubles Change Game, IOMA’s Rep. 
on Compensation & Benefits for L. Off., Sept. 2009, at 1, 5 [hereinafter Compensation Decisions 
Surveyed] (concluding that origination and contributing “fee income to the firm’s top line” are the two 
top factors in setting partner compensation). 
 80. Cotterman, supra note 30, at 11; see also Email from James D. Cotterman to Joan C. Williams 
(Feb. 14, 2010, 10:09 AM) (on file with Author).  
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Table 4: Top Ten Factors Listed as “Important” or 
“Very Important” in Setting Law Firm Compensation 
Majority 
Equity 
Partners 
% 
Majority 
Income 
Partners 
% 
Minority 
Equity 
Partners 
% 
Minority 
Income 
Partners 
% 
1. Revenue 
collected 
96% 1. Origination 93% 1. Origination 89% 1. Origination 93% 
2. Origination 95% 
2. Revenue 
collected 91% 
2. Revenue 
collected  86% 
2. Revenue 
collected 86% 
3. Billable 
hours 
86% 3. Billable 
hours 
81% 3. Billable 
hours 
83% 3. Committee 
rating 
83% 
4. Client 
matter 
expansion/ 
cross-selling 
87% 
4. Committee 
rating 81% 
4. Being 
billing partner 83% 
4. Billable 
hours 79% 
5. Firm 
management 81% 
5. Client 
matter 
expansion/ 
cross-selling 
78% 
5. Committee 
rating  77% 
5. Being 
billing partner 69% 
6. Committee 
rating 
82% 6. Firm 
management 
71% 6. Firm 
management 
74% 
6. Client 
matter 
expansion/ 
cross-selling 
67% 
7. Practice 
group 
management 
67% 
7. Being 
billing partner 61% 
7. Client 
matter 
expansion/ 
cross-selling  
66% 
7. Firm 
management 59% 
8. Whose 
work currently 
binds client 
66% 
8. Practice 
group 
management  
61% 
8. Whose 
work currently 
binds client 
63% 
8. Meeting 
threshold # of 
billable hours 
55% 
9. Being 
billing partner 56% 
9. Whose 
work currently 
binds client 
60% 
9. Partnership 
rating 54% 
9. Practice 
group 
management 
55% 
10. Partnership 
rating 
45% 
10. Meeting 
threshold # of 
billable hours 
56% 
10. Practice 
group 
management  
53% 10. Ownership 
share 
46% 
 
b. Individual Cash Flow Metrics 
Our findings confirm the opinions of law firm consultants 
concerning the dominant role of partners’ billable hours and originations. 
Our respondents showed a remarkable level of agreement about which 
factors are “important” or “very important” in the setting of partner 
compensation. The top three factors are origination, revenue collected, 
and the partners’ own billable hours; origination and revenue collected, 
as high-universal factors, were followed closely by billable hours. All 
assess the extent to which a partner functions as an individual cash flow 
generator within the firm; these will be referred to as the “individual cash 
flow” factors. Origination credit is the single most common of these 
factors, followed by the revenue collected by an individual partner. 
These would obviously be the crucial measures if an individual partner 
was in solo practice, for they measure whether the firm has clients, work, 
and cash flow. 
The next most common factor is another measure of client 
relationship: being the billing partner. In some firms, the billing partner 
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is almost always, or often, the originator; at other firms, the two functions 
overlap less. Because equity partners are much more likely to be billing 
partners than are income partners, being the billing partner is more likely 
to be important for minority equity partners (83%) than for others (56-
61%), since minority equity partners are much less likely to receive a 
high rating by the compensation committee or to be awarded origination 
credit. 
Individual cash flow factors can be designed in different ways. For 
example, billable hours can be assessed through a system that rewards 
those who work the highest possible number of billable hours, which is 
the typical system. An alternative, reported by 12% of equity-partner 
and 20% of income-partner respondents, is a system that requires 
partners to meet a billable-hours threshold, but does not give partners 
ever-increasing credit for working billable hours in excess of the 
threshold.81 Such a system reflects an assessment that partners’ time may 
be better spent balancing short-term profitability with contributions to 
the long-term future of the firm, through business development or 
human capital development. Among our respondents, the most-hours-
wins approach was close to twice as common as requiring partners to 
meet an hours threshold, with equity partners the least likely (44%) to 
report the threshold approach. 
Origination, too, can be designed in different ways. The most 
common is the “first touch” system, in which the partner who brings in 
the client is paid forever on all future work billed by that client—whether 
or not the “originator” did any work on the matter at hand. According to 
equity-partner respondents, his system is five times as common as one in 
which the originator only receives future credit if he or she is the 
attorney whom the client actually calls to work on a new matter.82 
Some firms have abolished formal origination credit altogether, 
although our survey shows that origination credit remains important in 
many of those firms. Other firms have moved towards systems that 
reward teams rather than individuals.83 Another trend is to reward not 
origination, but a lawyer who currently binds the client to the law firm: 
About half of majority and minority income partners, and two-thirds of 
majority and minority equity partners, report that this is “important” or 
“very important” in their compensation systems. 
 
 81. These are the percentages of respondents who listed the billable-hours threshold as “very 
important” in the setting of compensation. These percentages climb to 44% and 56%, respectively, in 
response to the question of what factors are either “very important” or “important.” 
 82. We do not report the statistic for income or minority partners, because nearly one-third of 
these groups were unsure or did not know how origination credit worked at their firms, as were nearly 
one-fourth of minority partners. 
 83. See discussion infra Part II.B.9. 
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c. Institutional Investment Measures 
Measures of long-term investments in the law firm as an ongoing 
institution, from teamwork to effective development of human capital to 
strategic initiatives, are much less likely to play an important role than 
are individual cash flow measures. Less than 10% of law firm 
compensation rewards teamwork, according to the Institute of 
Management and Administration.84 In our survey, teamwork does not 
show up in the top ten factors affecting compensation. Other institutional 
investments are weighted little, if at all, as discussed below. The only 
context in which respondents’ firms weigh institutional investments to 
any significant extent concerns client matter expansion or cross-selling, 
which was the fourth most common factor on equity partners’ lists, but 
less common for income partners (fifth), minority-equity partners 
(seventh), and minority-income partners (sixth). These data may indicate 
that income partners are less likely than equity partners, and minority 
partners are less likely than either group, to feel that they are able to 
gain fair credit for their contributions to client work when they lack 
origination credit. 
d. Committee Rating 
Rating by the committee in charge of compensation also was listed 
by many respondents as playing an important role in compensation. For 
majority-income and minority partners, rating by the compensation 
committee shows up in the top five factors; many equity partners listed it, 
too, although it appears to be a somewhat less common factor in 
determining equity partner compensation.85 In some firms, committee 
rating merely reflects objective metrics; in others, it can be partially or 
totally subjective. The role, and impacts, of subjectivity in the setting of 
law firm compensation will be discussed later in this report.86 
4. Which Factors Are Listed as “Very Important”? 
A greater divergence emerges between the three groups of partners 
when asked which factors are “very important” in setting compensation 
at their law firms. The following table lists the top factors listed as “very 
important” in ranked order: 
 
 
 
 
 84. Compensation Decisions Surveyed, supra note 79, at 5. 
 85. See supra Table 4. 
 86. See infra Part I.G. 
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Table 5: Top Ten Factors Listed as “Very Important” in 
Setting Law Firm Compensation 
Majority Equity 
Partners 
% Majority Income 
Partners 
% Minority 
Partners 
% 
1. Origination  66% 1. Revenue collected 
64% 
1. Revenue 
collected 
57% 
2. Revenue 
collected 
63% 2. Origination 60% 2. Origination 52% 
3. Committee 
rating 
62% 
3. Committee 
rating 
56% 
3. Committee 
rating 
47% 
4. Client matter 
expansion/ 
cross-selling 
37% 4. Billable hours  41% 4. Billable hours 35% 
5. Firm 
management 
27% 
5. Client matter 
expansion/ 
cross-selling 
36% 
5. Firm 
management  
27% 
6. Billable hours 26% 
6. Being billing 
partner 
27% 
6. Client matter 
expansion/ 
cross-selling 
26% 
7. Whose work 
currently binds 
client 
18% 
7. Ownership 
share 
21% 
7. Being billing 
partner 
25% 
8. Being billing 
partner 
18% 
8. Firm 
management 
19% 
8. Ownership 
share 
24% 
9. Rating by 
other partners 
12% 
9. Meeting 
threshold # of 
billable hours  
18% 
9. Whose work 
currently binds 
client 
18% 
10. Partnership 
rating 
11% 
10. Whose work 
currently binds 
client 
17% 
10. Meeting 
threshold # of 
billable hours 
17% 
 
This chart highlights the tremendous power of compensation 
committees at many, although not all, firms. Their ratings emerge high 
on the list for all partners and appear to play a particularly large role in 
the compensation of our equity-partner respondents. 
While equity, income, and minority partners agree that revenue 
collected and origination are the two most important factors, they 
reverse the order of importance, with equity partners more focused on 
origination, and with income and minority partners more focused on 
revenue collected.87 This probably indicates no more than that partners 
with books of business are more likely to be equity partners. All three 
groups listed “committee rating” as the third most important factor. 
Notably, majority income and minority partners both again highly rated 
“billable hours” as a factor in setting compensation.88 This presumably 
 
 87. Table 5 supra. 
 88. Compare Table 5, supra, with Table 4, supra. 
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signals that these two groups are less likely than equity partners 
generally to have origination credit. To majority income and minority 
partners, therefore, increasing billable hours appears to be one of the 
best ways to increase their compensation. Firm management seems more 
important to equity and minority partners than to income partners. 
Being the billing partner seems more important to majority than 
minority lawyers. 
5. What Factors Are Not Important in Setting Draw or Salary? 
The finding that individual cash flow categories are more important 
than factors that measure long-term investments in human capital 
emerges in sharp focus if we look at investment measures specifically. 
Effective development of the firm’s human capital and associate 
development rarely plays a role in partner compensation. Nor do 
teamwork, contributions to diversity, or community service. Even 
effective leveraging of associates, which is important for short-term 
profitability, does not play a significant role in respondents’ firms. The 
group most likely to be tapped to help with diversity efforts, minority 
partners, is the least likely to feel that the contributions to diversity 
efforts are rewarded. 
Table 6: Factors Rarely Listed as “Very Important” in 
Law Firm Compensation89 
Majority Equity 
Partners 
% 
Majority Income 
Partners 
% 
Minority 
Partners 
% 
14. Effective 
development of 
firm’s human 
capital 
7% 
14. Contributions 
to diversity efforts 
4% 
(tie) 13. Teamwork  
7% 
(tie) 
15. Effective 
leveraging of 
associates  
5% 14. Teamwork 4% (tie) 
13. Effective 
development of 
firm’s human 
capital 
7% 
(tie) 
16. Contributions 
to diversity 
3% 
16. Effective 
development of 
firm’s human 
capital 
2% 
(tie) 
16. Effective 
leveraging of 
associates 
5% 
18. Associate 
development 
work 
2% 
(tie) 
16. Effective 
leveraging of 
associates 
2% 
(tie) 
19. Pro bono 
and community 
service 
2% 
(tie) 
18. Pro bono and 
community 
service 
2% 
(tie) 
18. Associate 
development 
1% 
19. Contributions 
to diversity 
2% 
(tie) 
 
 
 89. Note that the overall ranking out of twenty-two possible factors is included in the table. 
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These factors are more often listed as “important” but not “very 
important,” as shown in Table 7 below. Equity partners are much more 
likely than income partners to believe that effective leveraging of 
associates and firm committee work (other than on diversity committees) 
play an important role in compensation at their law firms; minority 
lawyers again were in the middle, reflecting that group’s composition of a 
combination of income and equity partners. Fewer than one-in-three of 
each group of partners believed that associate development, firm 
committee work, or diversity contributions were “important” or “very 
important.” 
Table 7: Factors Less Often Listed as “Important” or 
“Very Important” in Law Firm Compensation90  
Majority Equity 
Partners 
% Majority 
Income 
Partners 
% Minority 
Partners 
% 
12. Effective 
leveraging of 
associates  
42% 
15. Effective 
leveraging of 
associates 
28% 
15. Effective 
leverage of 
associates 
32% 
16. Other firm 
committee work  
30% 
17. Associate 
development 
22% 
17. Associate 
development 
19% 
17. Contributions 
to diversity 
efforts  
29% 
18. Other firm 
committee work 
21% 
18. Contributions 
to diversity 
efforts 
18% 
18. Associate 
development  
27% 
19. Contribution 
to diversity 
efforts 
21% 
19. Other firm 
committee work 
17% 
 
Thus some of the activities crucial to the long-term health of law 
firms as institutions typically play little role in partner compensation. 
Today’s top lawyers will not live forever, yet their firms typically do not 
reward associate development or effective development of the firm’s 
human capital. Typically, firms do not reward all measures of teamwork, 
including teamwork itself, ironically. More intriguing still, effective 
leveraging of associates is often undervalued, while a partners’ personal 
hours billed, which cuts against effective leveraging, is overvalued. And, 
of course, committee work other than on the compensation or 
management committee is undervalued, with work on diversity often 
valued even less than other non-compensation committee work.91 
All this negatively impacts the compensation of women as a group. 
Women are more likely to serve on diversity or associates’ committees 
 
 90. Note that the overall ranking out of twenty-two possible factors is included in the table. 
 91. An interesting wrinkle is that studies show that serving on the firm’s recruitment committee 
does have a positive effective on compensation. See Dinovitzer, Reichman & Sterling, supra note 3, at 
835. 
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than on compensation, business development, or partnership selection 
committees.92 The Reichman and Sterling study of Colorado lawyers 
described a female department head in a medium-sized firm, Paula 
Kramer, thusly: 
She was the “go to” person for cases in a new practice area that she 
developed. She also was the head of the recruitment committee and 
the associates’ committee. All were essential to the smooth operation 
of the firm, but she was rarely given credit for the work she did on 
them. She told us that at “every compensation meeting I have . . . been 
really miserable.”93 
When she complained, her firm was shocked and raised her 
compensation, “but [it was] still not as high as the partner above her.”94 
Appointment of women to these less-powerful committees is driven, in 
part, “by the desire of firms, for good reasons, to have diversity in their 
committee rosters,” notes James J. Sandman, former Managing Partner 
of Arnold & Porter LLP and current General Counsel for the District of 
Columbia Public Schools.95 “Usually the most important committees are 
elected, often by a weighted vote, with the votes of partners having more 
shares carrying more weight.”96 The results speak for themselves: Women 
are underrepresented on elected compensation and executive 
committees. Sandman concluded, “Firms end up doing what they can—
through appointments to other committees—where they can to create 
committee opportunities for women.”97 
The issue is not malevolent intent, but results. Once women are 
asked to serve on the less powerful committees, it may be hard to say no. 
Said Kathryn Fritz, Managing Partner of Fenwick & West LLP: 
I do think generally, with respect to all administrative duties, it is much 
easier for men to say no and take no penalty for it because the 
assumption is they must be spending their time doing something else 
for the firm. A woman, on the other hand, both may feel more internal 
pressure to say yes (the “good girl” problem) and every “no” may raise 
a question about her commitment to the institution. I think this is just a 
different flavor of the potential/achievement dichotomy applied to a 
different set of tasks (he has a better potential way to spend his 
time/she needs to do what we ask her to do or she isn’t achieving).98 
 
 92. Judith S. Kaye & Anne C. Reddy, Essay, The Progress of Women Lawyers at Big Firms: 
Steadied or Simply Studied?, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 1941, 1947 (2008) (citing a 2001 New York State Bar 
Association study). 
 93. Reichman & Sterling, supra note 5, at 67. 
 94. Id. at 68. 
 95. Telephone Interview with James J. Sandman, Gen. Counsel, D.C. Pub. Schs. (Apr. 12, 2010). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Telephone Interview with Kathryn Fritz, Managing Partner, Fenwick & West LLP (Feb. 26, 
2010). 
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Sandman adds,  
When a man turns down a committee assignment saying, “I would like 
to concentrate on building my practice,” people tend to nod and say 
“that’s a smart decision.” That may happen less often if it’s a woman. 
Women are more likely to say “I’ve got a lot on my plate,” or to feel 
guilty and express their guilt.99  
This may be because women feel less entitled than men, or may be 
because they expect pushback if they simply refuse to serve in a direct 
way. 
In addition, social science documents that, in male-dominated 
environments, women often face pressures to play traditionally feminine 
roles. “I’m like the frigging firm mom,” said one woman, who clearly felt 
trapped by the role, “People come to me if they’re having problems.”100 
Social psychologists identify other traditionally feminine roles that may 
arise in workplace settings: the “princess,” who aligns with but does not 
threaten the dominance of a powerful man; the “cheerleader” who 
applauds male achievements; “Ms. Efficiency,” who cheerfully accepts 
the ministerial tasks; the “daughter” who looks up to the men around 
her.101 This pattern may also help explain why women end up playing 
traditionally feminine roles such as attending to the development of the 
young (associate development; running the summer program) and 
engaging in community building (pro bono committee). 
In short, women may well find themselves facing pressure, at times 
gentle and well-meaning, to contribute to law firms in ways that are 
important to the long-term health of the firm, but whose value is not 
rewarded when compensation levels are set. 
6. What Factors Are Important in Setting Bonuses? 
In roughly three-fourths of respondents’ firms, the same evaluation 
mechanisms and processes applied in the case of cash bonuses. Among 
respondents whose firms used a different system for bonuses, a mix of 
objective and subjective factors is used in roughly two-thirds of income-
partner respondents’ firms and half the firms of minority- and equity-
partner respondents. About one in four equity and minority partners, but 
 
 99. Telephone Interview with James J. Sandman, supra note 95. 
 100. Holly English, Gender on Trial: Sexual Stereotypes and Work/Life Balance in the 
Legal Workplace 119 (2003). 
 101. See, e.g., Kay Deaux et al., Level of Categorization and Content of Gender Stereotypes, 3 Soc. 
Cognition 145, 166 (1985); Peter Glick & Susan T. Fiske, An Ambivalent Alliance: Hostile and 
Benevolent Sexism as Complementary Justifications for Gender Inequality, 56 Am. Psychol. 109, 113 
(2001); Shelley E. Taylor, A Categorization Approach to Stereotyping, in Cognitive Processes in 
Stereotyping and Intergroup Behavior 83, 84 (David L. Hamilton ed., 1981); see also Joan C. 
Williams, The Social Psychology of Stereotyping: Using Social Science to Litigate Gender 
Discrimination Cases and Defang the “Cluelessness” Defense, 7 Emp. Rts. & Emp. Pol’y J. 401, 419–20 
(2003). 
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only 6% of income partners, reported that bonuses are awarded solely on 
subjective assessments. This probably reflects the fact that income 
partners’ bonuses tend to be very formula-driven and therefore, 
objective. About one-third of all respondents said that bonuses are 
rewarded solely on objective criteria. 
Wide variation exists with respect to bonuses. Comments indicate 
that firms use bonuses in a wide variety of contexts. Some examples are 
bonuses given to partners who had a particularly good year, to 
“overwhelming work on a firm (nonbillable) project,” to “friends of 
managing partners . . . and those on committee deciding compensation 
and bonuses,” to “extraordinary efforts or results in a given year by 
young partners,” to originators of new clients or new matters, to “the 
most highly compensated partners,” and finally, “It is a mystery to 
me . . . .” Another response indicated, “the threat of leaving [by] big 
originators appears to be very influential.” And another: “Our bonusing 
is very subjective and is simply ‘fairness’ based.” One respondent noted 
that bonuses depended on the overall profitability of the firm. Some 
firms give bonuses chiefly to income partners, while at other firms, they 
appear to go chiefly to equity partners. 
When bonuses were given, the top factors influencing prospective 
law firm compensation were very similar to the top factors used to set 
retrospective bonuses. Factors below the top four are considerably less 
common in the calculation of bonuses than they are in influencing 
prospective compensation. With the exception of majority income 
partners’ 44% agreement that committee ratings are “very important” in 
setting bonuses, the fifth-highest ranking item reached less than a 30% 
consensus among partners. 
Table 8: Top Factors Listed as “Very Important” in Setting Bonuses 
Majority 
Equity 
Partners 
% 
Majority 
Income 
Partners 
% 
Minority 
Equity 
Partners 
% 
Minority 
Income 
Partners 
% 
1. Revenue 
collected 63% 
1. Revenue 
collected  62% 
1. Committee 
rating 50% 
1. Revenue 
Collected 64% 
2. Origination  58% 2. Origination 56% 2. Revenue 
collected 
42% 2. Origination 61% 
3. Committee 
rating  
56% 
3. Client 
matter 
expansion/ 
cross-selling 
30% 3. Billable 
hours 
38% 3. Billable 
hours 
59% 
4. Billable 
hours  42% 
4. Billable 
hours 46% 4. Origination 34% 
4. Committee 
rating 56% 
5. Client 
matter 
expansion/ 
cross-selling 
29% 5. Committee 
rating 
44% Numbers too 
small to report 
— Numbers too 
small to report 
— 
 
We also analyzed what were the factors listed as either “important” or 
“very important” in the setting of bonuses. 
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Table 9: Factors Listed as “Important” or 
“Very Important” in Setting Bonuses 
Majority 
Equity 
Partners 
% 
Majority 
Income 
Partners 
% 
Minority 
Equity 
Partners 
% 
Minority 
Income 
Partners 
% 
1. Origination 81% 1. Revenue 
collected 
87% 1. Revenue 
collected 
77% 1. Revenue 
collected 
79% 
2. Revenue 
collected 81% 2. Origination 86% 2. Origination 75% 2. Origination 79% 
3. Committee 
rating 
75% 3. Billable 
hours 
77% 3. Committee 
rating 
72% 3. Committee 
rating 
78% 
4. Billable 
hours 71% 
4. Committee 
rating 69% 
4. Billable 
hours 69% 
4. Billable 
hours 70% 
5. Client 
matter 
expansion/ 
cross-selling 
69% 
5. Client 
matter 
expansion/ 
cross-selling 
70% 5. Being billing 
partner 
69% 
5. Client 
matter 
expansion/ 
cross-selling 
57% 
6. Firm 
management 
58% 6. Being billing 
partner 
56% 
6. Client 
matter 
expansion/ 
cross-selling 
59% 6. Being billing 
partner 
54% 
7. Whose work 
currently binds 
client? 
53% 7. Firm 
management 
50% 
7. Whose work 
currently binds 
client? 
57% 7. Firm 
management 
47% 
8. Being billing 
partner 41% 
8. Whose work 
currently binds 
client? 
47% 
8. Firm 
management 52% 
8. Practice 
group rating 44% 
 
 Once again, with the exception of cross-selling and committee 
ratings (themselves often based on individual cash flow metrics), 
individual cash flow metrics appear to predominate in the setting of 
bonuses. Consultant commentary confirms that bonus pools, which are 
becoming more common, typically are used to reward an equity partner 
who “had an unusually good year.”102 
7. Do the Factors That Are Important in Setting Compensation 
Differ from the Factors Important in Determining Elevation to 
Equity Partnership? 
Our survey also asked what factors play important roles in the 
decision whether to elevate lawyers from income to equity partner. Once 
again, revenue collected, billable hours, origination, and committee 
rating were the top four factors listed by all groups of respondents. Yet 
some striking differences emerged between the factors considered for 
elevation to equity partnership and the factors that influence partner 
compensation. Equity-partners’ responses suggest that teamwork (61%), 
effective leveraging of associates (43%), committee work (37%), effective 
development of the firm’s human capital (43%), associate development 
(36%), and contributions to diversity effects (32%) are considerably 
more likely to be considered “important” or “very important” for criteria 
for elevation to equity partnership than they are as criteria for partner 
 
 102. Cotterman, supra note 30, at 1 (stating that bonuses are becoming more common). 
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compensation. These factors may well play an important role in elevation 
to partnership than in partner compensation, because lawyers who are 
just being elevated to partnership status often do not yet have significant 
originations—which means that other factors inevitably play a larger 
role. 
D. The Allocation of, and Disputes over, Origination Credit 
Just today, a capital partner indicated to me in an email, which he 
copied to the client, that I should not have opened a new matter 
(regardless that he was getting credit for the new matter). . . . [T]his is a 
client that the capital partner inherited from another attorney who left 
the firm . . . . [F]rom what I can tell, I’ve worked with the client longer 
than he has. 
According to Rose, in many firms, origination credit ranges between 
20% and 25% of billings, with credit in some firms ranging as high as 
33%.103 This is particularly dramatic because, in many firms that award 
formal origination credit, such credit never “sunsets” but instead lasts 
forever: “Relationship credit survives until the partner has absolutely no 
involvement with the client any longer,” said one respondent. Of the 
equity-partner respondents who reported that their firms had origination 
credit, over half (56%) reported permanent credit for all work on a given 
client account. Another 11% of equity-partner respondents reported a 
different system: Partners received origination credit only for new work 
if the client placed the phone call to the original originating attorney 
when a new matter came in. Fully 11% did not know how origination 
credit worked at their firms, which, given the complexity of some firms’ 
systems and the ambiguities in the way origination credit is defined, 
probably is not surprising. In several comments, some respondents 
reported “sunsets”: that origination credit at their firm was limited to 
three years. Other firms had a functional, although not a formal, sunset: 
“Almost always some credit for future, frequent splitting with others; if 
originator becomes detached from client/work, this credit is given little 
or no weight.” 
Forty percent of equity-partner respondents worked in firms that 
formally award origination credit, yet this far underestimates the 
importance, and the prevalence, of origination credit. As noted above, 
origination is one of the top factors considered in setting compensation 
at most firms—even in firms that do not formally award origination 
credit.104 Of the 40% of firms that award formal origination credit, 88% 
reported systems that allow partners to split origination credit. This may 
 
 103. Rose, supra note 62, at 5. 
 104. See supra Tables 4 & 5. This is slightly lower than the percentage of firms in general: 
Cotterman reported in 2008 that 56% of law firms surveyed by Altman Weil, Inc. awarded formal 
origination credit. See Cotterman, supra note 30, at 1. 
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be more aspirational than commonplace: The 2009 Altman Weil survey 
reported that, in fact, “Strikingly few clients are ‘shared’ for origination 
purposes . . . .”105 Four out of five (80%) equity-partner respondents felt 
they had been denied their fair share of origination credit at some point 
over the past three years. Thirteen percent said this happened often, 
38% said it happened occasionally, and 30% said it had happened rarely. 
Income-partner respondents were more likely than equity partners 
to work in firms that awarded origination credit (50%). They were as 
likely as equity partners (88%) to report systems that allow partners to 
split origination credit. Income partners were a bit more likely than equity 
partners (83% versus 80%) to report having been denied their fair share 
of origination credit over the past three years, were more likely to 
believe that this happened to them often (18% versus 13%), and were 
less likely to believe it happened rarely (16% versus 30%). 
Minority partners were less likely than other respondents to work in 
firms that award origination credit (39%) and less likely to report 
systems that allow partners to split origination credit (76%). Minority 
partners were about as likely as other respondents to have been denied 
their fair share of origination credit: Approximately 20% of majority 
income and minority partners and 16% of majority equity partners 
report having “never” been denied credit. 
Table 10: Origination Credit 
 Majority 
Equity 
Partners 
Majority 
Income 
Partners 
Minority 
Income 
Partners 
Minority 
Equity 
Partners 
Minority 
Partners 
Work in firms that 
award origination 
credit 
40% 51% 46% 34% 39% 
Split origination 
credit 
91% 88% 85% — 76% 
Denied fair share of 
credit in last three 
years 
84% 82% — — 86% 
Often 14% 16% — — 19% 
Occasionally 37% 22% — — 19% 
Rarely 33% 22% — — 47% 
 
Minority-partner respondents were more likely than majority 
attorneys to face disputes about origination credit. Forty-eight percent 
faced them often or occasionally, compared with only about one-third 
(30%) of equity partners and income partners (32%). Minority-partner 
respondents also were less likely to report that such disputes occurred 
rarely (44% equity; 46% income; 32% minority) or never (27% equity; 
 
 105. Id. at 9. 
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22% income; 16% minority). This is an area with the strongest racial 
differences we identified. 
Table 11: Strong Racial Differences in Disputes over 
Origination Credit 
 
Majority 
Equity 
Partners 
Majority 
Income 
Partners 
Minority 
Partners 
Disputes over 
origination credit 
73% 78% 84% 
Often 8% 3% 12% 
Occasionally 22% 29% 40% 
Rarely 43% 46% 32% 
Never 27% 22% 16% 
 
Approximately one-fourth (27%) of majority equity-partner 
respondents reported feeling that a partner had tried to intimidate, 
threaten, or bully them into backing down in a dispute over origination 
credit, compared to 32% among majority income partners and 36% of 
minority partners. A few respondents felt that they had been bullied, but 
no more than men were: “But no more than that person would have 
bullied a male.” Some answers are vague (“I don’t feel comfortable 
providing this detail”), while many are vivid: 
• “I have had experiences where men tried to undermine my 
involvement, take credit for my work, claim credit for relationships 
when the client literally did not know who they were, and in the past, I 
have literally been told I was stupid to think the client was basing its 
decision to use my services on me.” 
• “My practice group leader demanded a large percentage of origination 
credit for a client where I had the relationship. Since he was my 
practice group leader, I felt intimidated to agree.” 
• “Senior equity partner with no real relationship to client made it 
difficult for me to claim origination for client where origination is 
obvious. Had to split origination with him 50/50 although he has not 
had relationship with or billed anything to client in over 3 years.” 
• “Senior white partner starts to have lunch with and meet with my 
clients—not telling me about it and excluding me from the client 
relationship. He then claims that he brought in the additional new 
work from my client, and that he is sharing one-half credit.” 
• “Once I was told that I shouldn’t take a matter, that I should give it to 
someone else because it wasn’t my direct area of litigation, which 
others never had to do in similar situations; once I was lead counsel on 
trial team but had no supervisory origination credit because partner 
who brought the matter in needed the credit that year.” 
Some respondents reported being told they would be cut out of future 
relationships unless they shared or ceded origination credit. Some 
examples: 
• “Threats to pull all future work and opportunities.” 
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• “Suggestion that would not refer any work in the future . . . .” 
• “Implicit threat that if they had to share credit on this matter, they 
wouldn’t come to you with another.” 
• “I can make your life difficult.” “On the other hand, I can be helpful.” 
• “I was actually told that I was ‘trying to steal clients’ and that it would 
make more sense to send all the work to associates. I struggled for a 
year trying to build up my own practice separate from managing 
partner who made the threat (and stood by it).” 
In yet another context, the power of firm leaders and power players 
emerges in clear focus. 
• “The other partner called the conflict screening people and told them 
to change the billing credit. I elected not to fight, as . . . he was on our 
firm’s management committee that made compensation decisions.” 
• “My own department chair opened a matter for one of my clients, but 
told me that ‘this one was his,’ and refused to give me any credit.” 
• “[Origination credit went] . . . to the practice group leader who was a 
good friend of the partner.” 
• “Origination from ‘institutional clients’ is not divided fairly. Cold calls 
that come into the firm are directed to the head of department or 
members of the board. Given that firm management (e.g. head of 
litigation department) does not change very often (once every ten to 
twelve years), this type of origination tends to cluster with the senior 
men.” 
• “[Originations are] not necessarily connected to your being the reason 
the client sent the work to the firm. Rather they arise from being the 
first contact and having the internal political clout to demand that you 
are to get all or most of the origination. If you are the one who 
expands a client relationship there is no reason to believe that you will 
get any origination credit for your effort.” 
• “[O]r they just lie to your face and agree to do something and simply 
never follow up equitably as promised. These same people make the 
decision on my future and pay.” 
Other researchers have made similar findings. Said a partner in a 
national firm, “Position and power determine whether [origination 
credit] is split or kept.”106 
A few comments highlight the costs to clients of law firms’ decision 
to treat partners as individual profit centers: 
• “Tax lawyer refused to work further on a multi-jurisdictional 
transaction if I did not let him be an originator and billing 
partner . . . at a point . . . when the deal needed him. I went to 
Managing Partner and won the ‘appeal’ but nothing happened to the 
tax lawyer.” 
 
 106. Nancy J. Reichman & Joyce S. Sterling, Recasting the Brass Ring: Deconstructing and 
Reconstructing Workplace Opportunities for Women Lawyers, 29 Cap. U. L. Rev. 923, 947 (2002). 
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• “I brought in work outside of my area and other partner refused to do 
work unless granted billing credit. I refused. Work was ultimately 
turned down resulting in my loss of client.” 
• “I went to our group Managing Partner to discuss the matter and he 
summarily dismissed my concerns and stated that partners often get 
work from different contacts at a client (not generally true unless by 
agreement of the partners) and that my client contact (a woman 
known to him) was just trying to rile things up.” 
Two recognizable patterns of gender bias emerge in the comments 
on disputes over origination credit. The first is that women have to “try 
twice as hard to get half as far” because of an unspoken sense that men 
are entitled to share credit (but women are not). As one respondent 
described, 
“This issue has been the most challenging for me. Some of the young 
male partners are just handed shared origination because ‘their brains 
also brought in the client.’ I have not had the same level of shared 
financial opportunity, despite more years of helping to build the very 
clients whom I requested to share . . . .” 
The second stems from a pattern known as the “double bind.” 
Studies show that women are often faulted for lacking in collegiality or 
for having personality problems for behavior that, in a man, is seen as 
showing “he is someone to be reckoned with,” or that “he knows his own 
worth.”107 Women who behave confidently and assertively are not as well 
received as men who do so.108 Women managers who adopt a direct, 
assertive style tend to trigger strongly negative evaluations.109 Women 
who act assertively tend to be less popular than men who do so.110 The 
risks for women are particularly pronounced when macho behavior is 
 
 107. Double Bind, Gend. Bias Learning Project, Ctr. for WorkLife Law, 
http://genderbiasbingo.com/stereotype_doublebind.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2011). 
 108. See, e.g., Doré Butler & Florence L. Geis, Nonverbal Affect Responses to Male and Female 
Leaders: Implications for Leadership Evaluations, 58 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 48, 54 (1990) 
(finding that “intellectual assertiveness by women in mixed-sex discussions elicits visible cues of 
negative affect” and that women leaders received fewer “pleased” responses and more “displeased” 
responses from group members, while male leaders experienced the opposite); Norma Costrich et al., 
When Stereotypes Hurt: Three Studies of Penalties for Sex-Role Reversals, 11 J. Experimental Soc. 
Psychol. 520, 520 (1975) (finding that women who engaged in sex-role reversals by behaving in line 
with stereotypes counter to their sex—namely, as aggressive-assertive—suffered adverse effects in 
their popularity ratings and in their perceived psychological adjustments); Madeline E. Heilman et al., 
Has Anything Changed? Current Characterizations of Men, Women, and Managers, 74 J. Applied 
Psychol. 935, 939 (1989) (“[O]ur analyses also indicated a set of items that . . . emerged to 
differentiate women managers from both men managers and successful managers. Included in this 
cluster of items are the following: bitter, hasty, quarrelsome, selfish, less understanding, independent, 
high need for power, and high need for achievement.”). 
 109. See, e.g., Alice H. Eagly et al., Gender and the Evaluation of Leaders: A Meta-Analysis, 
111 Psychol. Bull. 3, 3, 5–6, 12, 16 (1992) (“[W]omen in leadership positions [a]re devalued relative 
to their male counterparts when leadership [i]s carried out in stereotypically masculine styles, 
particularly when this style [i]s autocratic or directive.”). 
 110. See Costrich et al., supra note 108, at 520–30. 
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rewarded (“Rainmakers and aggressiveness are important factors,” 
noted one respondent), given that aggressiveness is often admired in men 
but faulted in women.111 Disputes over origination credit can jeopardize 
the reputations of women partners unless they have an unusual degree of 
political skill and savvy—more than is required of their male partners. 
This gender dynamic is exacerbated if women have to struggle to 
gain origination credit that would have been offered automatically to a 
man. When women have to fight more battles, not only are they likely to 
win fewer; they may well also pay a long-term price in terms of perceived 
likability. This exacerbates the situation because women who are not 
likeable often are judged more harshly than men who behave in similar 
ways. The double bind stems from a pattern called “ambivalent sexism,” 
in which women who show traditionally feminine behaviors are met with 
benevolent approval but not necessarily taken seriously, while women 
who do not are respected, but met with hostile disapproval.112 Of course, 
to succeed in most organizations requires being both liked and respected. 
One respondent provided the most concise description of the double 
bind offered: “I know that I will be punished [for] raising my concerns, 
and yet know that I’ll be mistreated if I don’t.” 
Another respondent voiced her fear of getting “a reputation as a 
difficult woman.” A third “got the impression the older male partner 
thought I was being ‘uppity.’” A fourth reported, “[T]hey make your 
position seem selfish . . . .” Allegations that women are behaving selfishly 
often stem from the unspoken insistence that women conform to 
feminine role expectations that women are selfless and communal, 
concerned more with the welfare of others than with their own 
interests.113 Said one respondent, “It is an old boys’ network and if you 
complain you are accused of not being a team player.” The speaker 
clearly has the impression that a man would not have encountered the 
same problem. 
 
 111. Id.; see also Eagly et al., supra note 109, at 16 (finding that women, but not men, “are 
negatively evaluated when they exhibit masculine leadership styles”). 
 112. See, e.g., Susan T. Fiske et al., (Dis)respecting Versus (Dis)liking: Status and Interdependence 
Predict Ambivalent Stereotypes of Competence and Warmth, 55 J. Soc. Issues 473, 476 (1999); Peter 
Glick & Susan T. Fiske, Ambivalent Sexism, in 33 Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 
115, 151 (2001). 
 113. See Joan Williams, UnBending Gender: Why Family and Work Conflict and What to 
Do About It 14–36, 251 (2000); see also Alice H. Eagly & Linda L. Carli, Through the Labyrinth: 
The Truth About How Women Become Leaders 78–81, 86–87 (2007) (positing that women who are 
too supportive or “communal” may be seen as weak, while women who are too assertive may not be 
liked by others); Eagly et al., supra note 109, at 11–12 (finding that women leaders were viewed more 
negatively when they adopted an autocratic, masculine leadership style, as compared with a 
democratic, feminine style). 
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Other respondents report harsh consequences for women who do 
not gracefully back down from their claims for origination credit or 
increased compensation: 
• “Meeting held with me and four male partners at which my 
contribution was totally trashed, until I agreed to waive any claim to 
credit and then my practice group leader took a cut himself apparently 
for facilitating. It was just me arguing against the two guys claiming 
the credit should be totally theirs although it had been my client for 
years. The other two guys said nothing.” 
• “Last year when I did make a stink after a phenomenal year, 
management purported to reward me for my great performance . . . but 
simultaneously hosed my husband, who is also partner, by exactly the 
same amount to the penny and denied (they were affronted by my 
drawing) any relationship.” 
These situations are particularly intriguing. Assuming the informants’ 
assessments were correct, one possible explanation may be found in 
studies that document that violating stereotypes can result in social and 
economic reprisals—a phenomenon known as the “backlash effect.”114 In 
a series of experiments, men and women competed in a computer game 
about football.115 When women beat men at this male-domain task, 
women tended to be sabotaged—male subjects were more likely to 
provide them with misleading clues in preparation for the next task to be 
undertaken.116 Subjects who sabotaged the gender deviants showed 
greater subsequent self-esteem.117 
When faced with the double bind, one strategy is to fight. The other 
strategy, less risky and probably more common, is to give way in order to 
conform to expectations.118 As respondents described: 
• “It is subtle. You just know not to make an issue of it.” 
• “I would never be confrontational about this.” 
• “I would never enter into such a dispute . . . for that would have 
extremely negative consequences with management far in excess of 
any benefit associated with the billing credit.” 
• “I just back down. I depend on others to share the origination with me 
so it is not worth it to me to get a reputation as one who disputes 
origination allocation.” 
• “I make it a practice not to dispute business generation credit with my 
partners. I am a firm believer that ‘what goes around comes around.’ I 
 
 114. See Laurie A. Rudman, Self-Promotion as a Risk Factor for Women: The Costs and Benefits of 
Counterstereotypical Impression Management, 74 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 629, 629 (1998) 
(“[W]omen may suffer from a backlash effect in which self-promotion may enhance perceptions of 
their qualifications, but at the cost of social rejection.”). 
 115. Laurie A. Rudman & Kimberly Fairchild, Reactions to Counterstereotypic Behavior: The Role 
of Backlash in Cultural Stereotype Maintenance, 87 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 157, 162 (2004). 
 116.  Id. at 162, 164. 
 117. Id. at 164. 
 118. See id. at 169–70, 172. 
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find, however, that my male partners are much more aggressive about 
‘grabbing’ credit in circumstances that might be questioned by an 
objective observer.” 
Survey comments alone cannot answer the relevant question: Are these 
respondents giving way because life is too short to fight with one’s 
partners, or because they recognize that they will pay a price if they are 
seen as “difficult” for doing what, in a man, would be seen as legitimately 
trying to protect one’s own interests? 
Research suggests that the double bind often plays a role in 
compensation decisions. One survey respondent referred researchers to a 
news article reporting on a study that women who attempt to negotiate 
often face negative consequences: “Anyone studying how women do, or 
do not, get ahead in the workplace should go read this article.”119 The 
relevant study, co-authored by Linda Babcock (who wrote Women Don’t 
Ask: Negotiation and the Gender Divide, which sends quite a different 
message)120 examined whether and how women negotiate for 
compensation.121 The first experiment, which investigated whether 
subjects were willing to hire candidates who initiated a salary 
negotiation, found both male and female evaluators were more likely to 
penalize female candidates who initiated salary negotiations more than 
men who did so.122 The second experiment, which explored people’s 
willingness to work with women who negotiated salary, found that 
women, but not men, incurred a large penalty for attempting 
negotiations—the penalty for women was 5.5 times steeper than the 
penalty for men—and both women and men were less willing to work 
with other women who initiated salary negotiations.123 The third 
experiment, which involved a video of the candidate’s interview, found 
that male evaluators—but not females—penalized women for salary 
negotiations, and they insisted on a greater degree of likeability from 
women candidates than from men.124 The final experiment found that 
when the evaluator was male, women were more reluctant than men to 
negotiate compensation.125 This difference did not exist when the evaluator 
was a woman.126 
 
 119. Hannah Riley Bowles et al., Social Incentives for Gender Divergences in the Propensity to 
Initiate Negotiations: Sometimes It Does Hurt to Ask, 103 Organizational Behav. & Hum. Decision 
Processes 84 (2007). 
 120. See generally Linda Babcock & Sara Laschever, Women Don’t Ask: Negotiation and the 
Gender Divide (2003). The basic thrust of Women Don’t Ask is that women do not get ahead, because 
they do not negotiate as well as men—that “women don’t ask.” Babcock’s academic studies suggest 
that many women do not ask because they encounter pushback when they do. See id. at 1–17. 
 121. Bowles et al., supra note 119, at 84. 
 122. Id. at 89. 
 123. Id. at 91. 
 124. Id. at 99. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
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Babcock and her co-authors asked whether women’s greater 
reluctance “to initiate negotiations over . . . compensation could be 
explained by the differential treatment of male and female negotiators”127 
and concluded “the answer is yes.”128 In the first three experiments, the 
authors pointed out, male evaluators punished women more than men 
for attempting to negotiate salary.129 In the third, women’s reluctance to 
negotiate salary disappeared when negotiating with a woman.130 “We 
show with this research that women’s disinclination relative to men to 
initiate negotiations over resources, such as compensation, may be traced 
to the higher social costs that they face when doing so.”131 The authors 
point out that their results indicate that society rewards women for living 
up to the feminine ideals of modesty, niceness, warmth, and sensitivity to 
others, and often penalizes women for engaging in the kind of 
competitive, self-promoting behaviors that are accepted as appropriate 
for men.132 “As lower-status group members making claims to the 
privileges of higher-status group members, women are likely to appear 
inappropriately demanding if they attempt to negotiate for higher levels 
of compensation,”133 especially (but not only) if the evaluator is a man. 
Other studies confirm that women’s inability to negotiate disappears 
when negotiating for others; it is only when they negotiate for themselves 
that they falter, for fear they will transgress the separate-spheres 
mandate of selflessness.134 This conclusion is further supported by the 
findings of a meta-analysis of sixty-two different studies.135 
This may help explain why few respondents to our survey were 
“satisfied” or “extremely satisfied” with their ability to negotiate or 
address any concerns they had regarding compensation. Only about one 
in five minority (21%) and income (19%) partners, and one in three 
(32%) equity partners reported satisfaction, as noted in Table 12. 
 
 
 
 127. Id. at 98–99. 
 128. Id. at 99.  
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 98–99. 
 133. Id. at 86. 
 134. Linda Babcock & Sara Laschever, Ask for It: How Women Can Use the Power of 
Negotiation to Get What They Want 156 (2009). 
 135. Amy E. Walters et al., Gender and Negotiator Competitiveness: A Meta-Analysis, 
76 Organizational Behav. & Hum. Decision Processes 1, 1 (1998). 
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Table 12: How Satisfied Are You with Your Ability to Effectively 
Negotiate or Address Any Concerns 
You May Have Regarding Your Compensation? 
 Majority 
Equity 
Partners 
Majority 
Income 
Partners 
Minority 
Partners 
Extremely satisfied 11% 2% 5% 
Satisfied 23% 20% 13% 
Neutral or mixed 
opinion 22% 32% 27% 
Dissatisfied 25% 20% 40% 
Extremely dissatisfied 19% 26% 16% 
 
Both partnership status and race significantly affected whether our 
respondents felt comfortable raising questions or concerns about their 
compensation with law firm management or their firm’s compensation 
committee. Over half of majority equity-partner respondents (53%) felt 
“comfortable” or “extremely comfortable,” but only about one-third 
(34%) of majority income partners and minority partners did. Nearly one 
in three equity partners (32% majority; 36% minority) felt 
“uncomfortable” or “extremely uncomfortable” raising such issues, as 
compared to 45% of majority income partners. Minority income partners 
reported the highest level of discomfort (61%). Discomfort about raising 
questions and concerns may stem from personal hesitations, or it may 
reflect fears of pushback that are exacerbated not only by gender, but also 
by race. 
On the bright side, some respondents reported that they had not run 
into trouble over matters of origination, or that their firms dealt effectively 
with partners who are unfair in the allocation of origination credit. Some 
examples: 
• “The compensation committee knows which partners have a habit of 
not distributing credit fairly and makes behind-the-scenes adjustments.” 
• “Credit is negotiated between partners, and partners who have a 
reputation for ‘fairness’ in credit sharing and collaboration, arguably 
have a competitive advantage in the long haul.” 
• “In our firm, we have a policy that each partner will help others on 
their pitches for no compensation or share of the client if the client 
comes on board . . . .” 
• “[In our lockstep system, where] the ideal is that we are a team and it 
takes everyone to make the firm profitable for us all, I don’t want to 
let my partners down and I work harder. I don’t think it is just women 
either. I believe research shows that there are many motivators to 
human behavior other than money.” 
Other respondents felt well equipped to deal with any problems that 
arose: 
• “I generate almost all of my own work ($2.5 million+ book), so I am 
rarely in a position where I have to ask for credit. When I do pitch 
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work with other partners, I ask for an agreement before the pitch that 
we will split any credit for the new work equally. If a partner won’t 
agree to this arrangement then I don’t do a pitch with them.” 
• “If there is resistance I don’t push the issue. I would not want to 
poison my well over this sort of thing. It does however influence my 
actions going forward.” 
Disputes over origination credit are handled typically either through 
negotiations between the affected partners or through review by a 
compensation or other internal committee. Equity-partner respondents 
were more likely (67%) than income-partner respondents (56%) to 
report disputes handled by negotiation. Income partners were much less 
likely to report that disputes over origination credit were handled by the 
compensation or other internal management committee (28%, as 
compared with 48% of equity partners). 
Income-partner respondents (21%) and both groups of minority-
partner respondents (25%) were much less likely than equity partners 
(45%) to report being “satisfied” or “extremely satisfied” with the way 
such disputes are generally resolved. Majority and minority income 
partners were considerably more likely to be “dissatisfied”: 31% of 
income and 42% of minority income partners were “dissatisfied,” as 
opposed to 17% of minority and majority equity partners. 
In short, disputes over origination credit are a significant factor in 
the lives of many women lawyers. Among the 50% of respondents whose 
firms awarded origination credit, four out of five equity partners, and 
even more income and minority partners, reported having been denied a 
fair share of origination credit in the past three years. Minority-partner 
respondents were even more likely than majority women to find 
themselves in disputes over origination credit. Most disturbing, a quarter 
of the equity-partner respondents, a third of the income-partner and the 
minority-equity respondents, and 40% of the minority-income respondents 
reported feeling that a partner had tried to intimidate, threaten, or bully 
them into backing down in a dispute over origination credit. 
E. Is the Real Problem That Women Have Less Time for 
Rainmaking? 
A common assumption is that women’s compensation is lower than 
men’s, because they have less time for rainmaking.136 But such comments 
were rare in our study—a finding reinforced by PAR’s recent study of 
part-time partners, which found that part-time equity partners (virtually 
all of whom are women) tend to do as much, or more, rainmaking, as do 
 
 136. Cynthia Thomas Calvert et al., Project for Attorney Retention, Reduced Hours, Full 
Success: Part-Time Partners in U.S. Law Firms 8, 14 (2009). 
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full-time partners.137 Indeed, some comments indicated the opposite 
situation: 
• “Women . . . tend to be lone rangers at the firm (i.e. they are not part 
of the big teams on big cases). . . . On the other hand, many of the 
partners (all male) working for the leaders of the section serve as 
‘support’ lawyers—they spend all their time billing hours on their 
senior partners’ clients’ files. Naturally, the senior partner ensures 
they are promoted in order to keep his kingdom growing . . . . The 
women tend to leave and try to find a firm that rewards the ability to 
generate business.” 
• “I have . . . the distinct impression that [origination] . . . matters not at 
all to determining my compensation as I have been categorized as a 
‘worker bee.’” 
More common were comments to the effect that respondents’ firms 
did not provide women with equal opportunity to participate in client 
pitches: 
• “Women are routinely left out of client pitches and have to scream to 
get the attention of marketing professionals at the firm. The firm 
simply does not take female lawyers seriously.” 
• “I have not been invited or gone to a beauty contest in the past three 
years. My firm does not adequately compensate ‘service’ partners.” 
• “While the compensation at my firm is on its face objective . . . I have 
found that women who are ‘service’ partners do not have as many 
opportunities to work on high-profile cases and clients. Those 
opportunities more often than not go to men and as a result their 
compensation is increased.” 
• “Women are not groomed in the same way men are at the firm for 
business development . . . . You have to be in the boys’ club to get the 
origination, which is really the way power is measured at the 
firm . . . . [T]hey are perceived as not being able to develop clients and 
they are encouraged to keep their noses to the grindstone. Then when 
they don’t have their own business, they are forced out. And no one 
worries about this because the powers that be figure by this time the 
women will be getting ready to have a baby, etc.” 
• “Although I feel like I am well compensated and the compensation 
system is fair currently, I do not think I have as many opportunities to 
participate in pitches and other important matters as my male 
counterparts.” 
• “My concerns regarding partnership compensation are not about the 
‘fairness’ of how the system compensates (I think the determinations 
made are very fair in that they accurately compensate partners for 
their contributions in past years), but rather about the ability of 
women partners to get the types of opportunities and responsibilities 
that generate the ‘objective’ (billable hours, client generation) and 
‘subjective’ (management, client responsibility, trial experience) 
performance that the system ultimately rewards.” 
 
 137. Id. 
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The Reichman and Sterling study, based on interviews, found quite a 
different dynamic at work: 
I was certainly one of the higher billing partners that period of my time 
there. But it was still hard to attract associates to work with me because 
I was never one of the partners who was yelling at them that they had 
to do my work . . . . It was very hard for me and it got to be not worth 
the effort to try to put out what I needed to put out to get the 
associates to stay on my work. They would tend to put my work and 
down pick up somebody else’s work . . . . My clients were getting pissed 
off . . . . I think the associates liked me. It certainly wasn’t a popularity 
contest. It’s just that that’s the way their bread is buttered . . . . I had to 
be head of the hiring committee, which meant that I had to interview 
all these same [associates] who wouldn’t work for me later and to 
persuade my partners to have interviews with them so that they could 
ultimately go and work for them.138 
This partner quit her firm and opened a solo practice.139 Another 
respondent said that the politics of her firm made it impossible for her to 
keep practicing: 
It’s actually one of the reasons I left private practice cause I had grown 
my book to a point where I couldn’t service it myself any longer or I 
was going to go nuts. I finally got to a point where I hired a new 
associate dedicated to my work and she was very, very good and that 
got recognized very quickly and people started to take her away—little 
by little, bit by bit. What can you do? She needs to get out there and 
work with other partners if she wants to move up the ladder internally 
in the firm. I saw the handwriting on the wall . . . .140 
Over half of our respondents reported situations in which they had 
participated in “beauty contests” but had not been included in the client 
work that resulted. Over 70% of minority income partners, 58% of 
minority equity partners, 55% of majority equity partners, and 48% of 
majority income partners reported that in the last three years, they had 
participated in successful client pitches in which they did not end up 
billing a significant number of hours. Forty-two percent of majority and 
minority equity partners, 48% of minority income partners, and 31% of 
majority income partners reporting having this happen once or twice, 
while 14% of majority equity partners, 18% of minority partners and 8% 
of majority income partners had experienced this three or more times. 
Respondents also reported that in the last three years, many had 
participated in successful client pitches but did not receive a 
proportionate share of the origination credit or otherwise have their 
contribution recognized financially. Forty percent of majority equity 
partners and 37% of majority income partners reported this experience. 
Among minority partners, 52% of income partners and 39% of equity 
 
 138. Reichman & Sterling, supra note 5, at 57–58. 
 139.  Id. at 57. 
 140. Id. at 64–65. 
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partners reported this experience. This happened once or twice among 
one-fourth of minority equity partners and majority income partners, 
while 28% of majority equity partners and 35% of minority income 
partners experienced this once or twice; a slightly smaller proportion of 
majority equity and income partners (12% each) had encountered this 
three or more times in the prior three years as compared to minority 
partners (15%). 
F. Lack of Succession Planning 
Who inherits the credit when an attorney leaves the firm? Firms that 
have origination credit typically allow it to be passed on if an attorney 
leaves a firm: Only 4-7% of respondents said their firms disallowed this. 
Roughly one in three majority equity partners, and one in five majority 
income partners reported no consistent approach, with minority partners 
in between (29%). The most common system reported was that partners 
with origination credit are allowed to decide who will inherit their 
origination credit, with 26% of majority equity partners, 28% of minority 
equity partners, and 30% of majority income partners reporting this 
practice. Minority income partners were most likely (48%) to identify 
this practice as their firm’s approach to succession planning for 
origination credit. Much less common was for firm management to play a 
role (6-14%). Clients rarely played a role in choosing their new lawyers 
(1-3%). A surprising proportion of each group of partners did not know 
how succession was handled at their firms: 24% of majority income 
partners, 11% of majority equity partners, and 9% of minority partners. 
Most comments said that the partner who “owns” the client chooses 
the successor. A few felt this system had a negative effect on women: 
• “Succession appears to consist of persons bequeathing the credit to 
their ‘chosen person,’ w[ho] is typically a white male.” 
• “Men are consistently provided with succession opportunities or the 
opportunity to get credit for landing a client—women are not.” 
• “When partners leave and their clients stay they have not been even 
partially assigned to me as requested even though I have built 
relationships with these clients and often do much of the work.” 
Responses indicated that more firm involvement appears to be a trend. 
• “If the originating attorney leaves the firm but the client stays, the 
Compensation Committee may transfer the origination credit to 
another shareholder who demonstrates that he or she is the primary 
cause of the client’s continued use of the firm’s services.” 
• “Often the current partner in charge has a large say . . . . However, the 
firm is becoming more active in selecting successors. The firm does not 
allow partners to pass on credit for a client without approval of 
management.” 
• “Successor is chosen based on the best interest of the client.” 
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A few respondents mentioned that origination credit ended at their firms 
if the originating attorney left the firm: “When a partner leaves, the 
client is assigned to the firm in general.” Only a few comments indicated 
that the client had a say in deciding what happens. For example: “Mostly, 
subjective determined by [the] partner in charge, but firm management 
occasionally ‘chooses’. . . . I bet clients sometimes pick too.” 
A few comments described active firm involvement: 
• “Our approach is to introduce a client to more than one originating 
partner so there is a team that is available to service the account.” 
• “We encourage each senior partner to come up with and propose a 
plan to transition key clients. The plan is reviewed by the practice 
group head and the Advisory Board. The focus is not on who becomes 
the new ‘engagement partner’ but on making sure the client is 
connected to enough people that it will remain with the firm.” 
Clearly, in institutions in which women tend to be more junior partners, 
systems that continue to reward lawyers for service rendered years ago 
will disadvantage women far into the future. 
G. Subjectivity 
By a wide margin, most respondents had compensation systems that 
combine objectivity and subjectivity: 85% of equity-partner respondents 
reported such systems, while 10% had completely subjective systems, 
and 4% had completely objective systems. Our respondents reported a 
sharply higher percentage of systems that combine objectivity and 
subjectivity, and a sharply lower percentage of firms that rely on 
completely subjective systems than do medium and large firms in 
general. One consultant’s study reported that only 32% of law firms with 
100 or more lawyers had a combination of objectivity and subjectivity, 
while 42% rely on totally subjective systems.141 
Altman Weil’s 2009 survey found that just over one-third of 
respondents reported that 76% or more of total partner compensation at 
their firms is subjective.142 An additional 35% of respondents reported 
that some part of compensation was subjective, but said this component 
counted for less than 75% of total compensation.143 Our respondents also 
had a sharply lower percentage of purely objective systems: The Altman 
Weil survey found that nearly one-third of law firms had compensation 
systems with no subjective component.144 Both differences probably 
reflect that our respondents were more likely to be in large law firms 
than are lawyers in general, and that large law firms are more likely to 
 
 141. See Alan R. Olson, Subjective Law Firm Compensation Systems, Marketing and Origination, 
Rep. to Legal Mgmt., Apr. 2003, at 6–7 (Altman Weil, Inc.).  
 142. Cotterman, supra note 30, at 9. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
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have subjectivity as a significant part of their systems. Income and 
minority partners reported similar findings. In other firms, every partner 
votes on the compensation of every other partner, typically using 
subjective criteria in the process. “Each lawyer can use whatever criteria 
she wants to determine her vote . . . .” 
A flood of comments stressed that law firm compensation is 
subjective even when objective factors are considered. Some examples: 
• “Subjective application of a list of 12 objective criteria.” 
• “Articulated 10 factors but application is subjective.” 
• “Factors related to compensation are published but decisions seem 
totally random.” 
• “There are ‘policies’ for determining compensation, including a 
number of objective criteria regarding billings, hours, client 
generation, and your history, but there is lots of room for subjective 
variations.” 
• “‘Numbers’ (amounts billed, amounts collected, origination, hours 
worked) are considered; these are objective criteria. But how these 
objective factors are weighed and how other factors are taken into 
account is subjectively done by the executive committee . . . . [B]onuses 
are given every year (totally within the discretion of the executive 
committee.)” 
• “Purportedly based on origination, managing, responsib[ility] and 
working collections for three-year period, but decisions subjectively 
made by Comp Committee.” 
Subjectivity is inevitable and appropriate in setting law firm 
compensation. A completely objective system is infeasible in most firms, 
given the wide range of contributions made and roles played by various 
partners. Yet decisions made on the basis of subjective criteria are 
especially vulnerable to the influence of stereotypes and bias.145 The 
stereotypes that emerge boost men but operate as a drag on women in 
male-dominated workplaces. Such workplaces define competence in 
ways that are considered a natural fit with the stereotypical man—
ambitious, aggressive, rational, direct146—but an uneasy fit with the 
stereotypical woman—who is seen as modest, selfless, and emotional.147 
Because stereotypes drive perception and memory, people tend to 
notice and remember stereotype-consistent information better than 
 
 145. See Bielby, supra note 46, at 123 (“[P]ersonnel systems whose criteria for making decisions 
are arbitrary and subjective are highly vulnerable to bias due to the influence of stereotypes . . . .”); see 
also Susan T. Fiske & Shelley E. Taylor, Social Cognition 246–85 (1984) (discussing the default 
mechanisms of social inference that operate most particularly in the absence of complete and/or 
reliable information). 
 146. See Jeanette N. Cleveland et al., Women and Men in Organizations: Sex and Gender 
Issues at Work 44 (2000). 
 147. Madeline E. Heilman, Description and Prescription: How Gender Stereotypes Prevent 
Women’s Ascent Up the Organizational Ladder, 57 J. Soc. Issues 657, 658 (2001). 
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stereotype-inconsistent information.148 Because stereotypes drive 
inference, observers tend to attribute behavior to stereotype-consistent 
explanations rather than to stereotype-inconsistent ones.149 Consequently, 
men’s successes tend to be attributed to abiding dispositions, while 
women’s successes tend to be attributed to fleeting, outside conditions: 
This pattern is often called the “he’s skilled, she’s lucky” syndrome.150 
The reverse is also true: Men’s failures tend to be attributed to outside 
conditions (no one could have won before that judge) while women’s 
tend to be attributed to stable personality traits (she lacks the 
forcefulness to be a litigator).151 These simple principles account for the 
sense, mentioned above, that women (and people of color) have to “try 
twice as hard to get half as far.”152 Unfortunately, once stereotypes are 
activated, they tend to reinforce themselves, as new information is 
interpreted through the lens of stereotypes—information that then is 
interpreted as further evidence of the proof of the stereotypes’ 
accuracy.153 
These processes appear to be at work in the lives of our 
respondents. For example, several comments report that objective 
factors sometimes are given different values for men and women. 
• “Thus, some factors are ‘important’ if they justify paying a man, 
especially a man with a family, . . . and other factors are ‘important’ if 
they will justify paying a woman, especially a single woman, less.” 
• “While statistics are considered in the process, instances of double and 
triple counting for the same business [is] rampant among the boys’ 
club, while women rarely get the same level of credit unless they are in 
a position to ‘walk’ the business.” 
 
 148. See generally David L. Hamilton & Jeffrey W. Sherman, Stereotypes, in 2 Handbook of 
Social Cognition I (Robert S. Wyler. Jr. & Thomas K. Scrull eds., 2d ed. 1994) (summarizing two 
decades of research on this phenomenon, called “illusory correlation”). For further discussion of this 
trend, see Galen V. Bodenhausen & Robert S. Wyer, Jr., Effects of Stereotypes in Decision Making 
and Information-Processing Strategies, 48 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 267, 280–81 (1985). 
 149. See Bodenhausen & Wyer, supra note 148, at 279–81. 
 150. See Jeffrey H. Greenhaus & Saroj Parasuraman, Job Performance Attributions and Career 
Advancement Prospects: An Examination of Gender and Race Effects, 55 Organizational Behav. & 
Hum. Decision Processes 273, 274, 276, 290 (1993); see also Janet K. Swim & Lawrence J. Sanna, He’s 
Skilled, She’s Lucky: A Meta-Analysis of Observers’ Attributions for Women’s and Men’s Successes and 
Failures, 22 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 507 (1996).  
 151.  See Greenhaus & Parasuraman, supra note 150, at 274, 276, 290. 
 152. See supra Part I.D. and infra Part II.B.7. 
 153. See Bodenhausen & Wyer, supra note 148, at 279 (“The effects of activating a stereotype 
appear to override the effects of other information available about the target. . . . [S]tereotypes 
functioned as judgmental heuristics in interpreting the target’s behavior and why it occurred . . . .”); 
Lucy Johnston, Resisting Change: Information-Seeking and Stereotype Change, 29 Eur. J. Soc. 
Psychol. 799, 799 (1996) (finding that stereotype-preservation bias affected information gathering and 
prevented modification of existing stereotypic beliefs); see also Greenhaus & Parasuraman, supra note 
150, at 275–78 (discussing gender differences in performance attributions and how those attributions 
inform and reinforce supervisors’ subsequent behavior toward their subordinates). 
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• “Each of the items listed above assumes uniform application of the 
factors. [T]hese items matter more for some partners but not for 
others . . . . That should be a focus of whether women partners’ 
compensation is commensurate with that of their male colleagues.” 
• “Again, depends on who is being compensated, especially with respect 
to whom management favors. A factor that means nothing as [to] one 
partner can be the reason to compensate another partner, if someone 
on management wants to protect/cover that person.” 
These comments indicate a specific pattern fed by the general principles 
outlined above. Eric L. Uhlmann and Geoffrey L. Cohen found that 
when two job candidates were considered for a male-dominated job, 
respondents preferred the male candidate when he had more experience, 
citing the importance of experience, but they still preferred the male 
candidate when the male candidate had more education, citing the 
importance of education.154 In both cases, a female candidate, who was 
objectively very similar, lost out.155 
The same basic principles also drive another well-documented 
pattern, called leniency bias, in which objective rules are applied 
leniently to men but rigidly to women.156 Some responses demonstrate 
this pattern: 
• “My compensation was ‘adjusted’ those years I worked less than goal 
due to young children. Several of my male colleagues have worked 
equivalently under goal for years with no adjustments made. Instead, 
I’m told that they have illness/family/other issues that we all must 
support them through.” 
• “One disparity I see is that male partners who experience a decline in 
business due to factors outside their control are protected from a 
reduction in their partnership share while the earnings of similarly 
situated women partners decline rapidly and dramatically.” 
Most of the patterns above link back to a basic precept: Men enjoy an 
assumption of competence in male-dominated environments, while 
women seem not to “fit.”157 As a result, women may find that they need 
to prove themselves over and over again. A 1988 report concluded that 
women lawyers felt they had to “work harder, do better and make fewer 
mistakes” than men, and that they are “treated with a presumption of 
incompetence,” whereas male lawyers enjoy a presumption of 
competence that is “overcome only after numerous significant mistakes.”158 
 
 154.  See, e.g., Eric Luis Uhlmann & Geoffrey L. Cohen, Constructed Criteria: Redefining Merit to 
Justify Discrimination, 16 Psychol. Sci. 474, 475–77 (2005) (discussing unfettered discretion in hiring 
criteria, and noting that criteria used to assess merit can be defined flexibly to favor certain groups). 
 155. Id. at 479. 
 156. See Marilynn B. Brewer, In-Group Favoritism: The Subtle Side of Intergroup Discrimination, 
in Codes of Conduct: Behavioral Research into Business Ethics 164–67 (David M. Messick & 
Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 1996). 
 157. See Madeline E. Heilman, Sex Bias in Work Settings: The Lack of Fit Model, 5 Res. Org. 
Behav. 269, 280 (1983). 
 158. ABA Comm’n on Women in the Prof., Report to the House of Delegates 12 (1988). 
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Our survey suggested that women still may have to prove themselves 
over and over again. Some examples: 
• “I firmly believe that the achievements of women in the firm are 
routinely and systemically discounted and have confirmed that 
through an analysis of compensation statistics. We are called upon to 
contribute heavily in administrative time and commitment, to build big 
books of business and bill [lots of] hours to ‘earn’ our place.” 
• “There are clearly discrepancies with male and female partners with 
equal or better numbers from an objective standpoint. If you want to 
appeal, you are appealing to the same seven people who made that 
decision.” 
• “It is very difficult with our firm to figure out their logic. There are 
several male partners whose numbers are significantly less than female 
equity partners but their compensation is dramatically higher.” 
A quite different type of bias emerges from the assumption that 
men are breadwinners while women are not. This leads to the unspoken 
sense that men with children “need” the money, whereas women with 
children do not, because they have men supporting them. 
• “Perception with respect to whether the partner ‘needs’ the income, 
which leads to less pay for women (particularly married women) than 
that for men (particularly men with children to support).” 
• “In setting a female partner’s compensation, it is my impression that 
the firm considers whether a woman will have children [and] take the 
allotted maternity leave, whether the woman will return to work, and 
whether the woman will return full- or part-time. All of these factors 
appear to negatively impact a woman’s compensation and equity 
partner track.” 
• “[T]he firm seems to use whatever factors justify paying men more and 
women less, particularly men with families.” 
• “For example, that a man, recently divorced, was now ‘effectively a 
single parent’ and therefore needed a raise, while [everyone else was] 
being cut . . . .” 
• “I am expecting in January. In December, met billing obligations, got 
de minimis bonus. Told the firm would be flexible with me in future. 
Never asked for flexibility. Just wanted fair bonus for past year.” 
Decisionmaking that is subjective and unchecked gives free rein to 
gender stereotyping. This stereotyping reflects the unspoken sense that 
men inherently possess the skills one needs to succeed in the law, a skill 
set which, both historically and traditionally, is associated with men and 
masculinity.159 
 
 159. See Peter Glick, Trait-Based and Sex-Based Discrimination in Occupational Prestige, 
Occupational Salary, and Hiring, 25 Sex Roles 351, 365 (1991); Peter Glick, Korin Wilk & Michele 
Perreault, Images of Occupations: Components of Gender and Status in Occupational Stereotypes, 
32 Sex Roles 565, 570 (1995); Peter Glick, Cari Zion & Cynthia Nelson, What Mediates Sex 
Discrimination in Hiring Decisions?, 55 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 178, 185–86 (1988); Heilman, 
supra note 157, at 280; see also Joan Acker, Hierarchies, Jobs, Bodies: A Theory of Gendered 
Organizations, 4 Gender & Soc’y 139, 151–53 (1990). 
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H. The Perils of Self-Advocacy for Women 
It can also be referred to as “law of the jungle”—those who fight for 
credit and are in the inner circle get origination credit. 
The most common forms of input into partner compensation 
decisions reported by our respondents were objective reports of billables, 
such as collections and originations: 92-94% of respondents reported this 
type of input. The next most common input was partners’ written self-
advocacy, reported by 69% of minority-partner respondents, and 77-79% 
of other respondents. Next most common were evaluations by heads of 
practice groups or departments—reported by 49% of minority equity 
partners and 66–68% of other respondents—followed by evaluations by 
other partners—reported by 21% minority income, 41% income, and 
43% equity partners—and committee interviews—reported by 28–29% 
minority, 35% income, and 47% equity partners. In a small percentage of 
firms, as noted above, each partner votes on the compensation of every 
other partner. 
A number of respondents commented that they needed to fill out 
self-assessments but that, in practice, these seemed to play a limited role 
in compensation decisions. Said one: “They say self-assessments and 
meeting with partners are considered but they are not.” Another 
responded, “[p]artners are asked to fill out self-assessment[s], but it is 
unclear how much they matter.” Sometimes self-evaluations are 
combined with direct lobbying of the decisionmaker(s): “Partners write a 
self-evaluation, but my assessment is that they have no impact. Numbers 
and individual ‘lobbying’ of the firm chair seem to affect compensation.” 
Where self-assessments and personal lobbying are important, 
women may face another facet of the double bind. Women often 
encounter pushback for self-promotion. To quote one study, “[s]elf-
promotion may be instrumental for [establishing competence] . . . yet 
women who self-promote may suffer social reprisals for violating gender 
prescriptions to be modest.”160 Women may be reluctant to self-promote 
for fear they will be seen as unfeminine and pushy. In short, “women 
may be stuck in a Catch-22 in which they are damned if they do self-
promote, and damned if they do not.”161 
All this affects women partners. Most systems rely on partners to 
put their best case forward for increased compensation, either in writing, 
or in person, or both. In some firms, this self-advocacy is directed to the 
head of the firm. In others, it is directed to management or compensation 
committee members. In a few firms, it is directed to every one of one’s 
 
 160. Rudman, supra note 114, at 629. 
 161. Laurie A. Rudman, To Be or Not To Be (Self-Promoting): The Consequences of 
Counterstereotypical Impression Management, in Power and Influence in Organizations 287, 290 
(Roderick M. Kramer & Margaret A. Neale eds., 1998). 
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partners. This places many women partners in the situation of having to 
have one or many hallway conversations where they detail their 
accomplishments—and may well face one or more crucial partners who 
find this distasteful: “You certainly think highly of yourself, don’t you?” 
may be the reaction. 
I. De-Equitized Partners 
Some people want to make much more money at the cost of others’ 
compensation . . . . [Others] think we have to have a stronger upper tier 
of compensation to attract laterals. The result, in my mind, is fewer 
people making equity partner and more existing partners being de-
equitized. 
Fourteen percent of the majority income partners, 12% of minority 
partners, and 3% of the majority equity partners had reported that they 
had been de-equitized.162 In each group, the total number who responded 
to this question was small, so these numbers should be treated with 
caution: based on their self-identifications, eight minority partners and 
twenty majority partners said they had been de-equitized. 
The most common factor identified by the equity partners was a low 
level of originations (63%), trailed distantly by low billable hours (25%). 
Among the income partners, the most common factor was a firm’s 
decision to increase profits per partner (52%), trailed by low billable 
hours (30%) and low originations (26%). 
For income partners who had been de-equitized, the most common 
factor was their firms’ decision to increase profits per partner (52%), 
followed by low billable hours (30%) and low origination of new clients 
(26%). 
Minority partners, half of whom were equity partners, were about as 
likely as majority income partners to have been de-equitized (12%). For 
them, the most common factor was a firm’s decision to increase its profits 
per partner (63%), trailed distantly by low new client origination (38%) 
and low existing partner expansion (38%). 
A small number of the comments reflected a decision by an 
individual partner to cut back her commitments due to childcare 
responsibilities: 
• “I had twins (so three children) and decided that I wanted to reduce 
the commitment [while they were young] to client development and 
marketing, which was expected of equity partners . . . . I was told that I 
would be welcomed back as an equity partner in the future. I regained 
equity partner status when the girls were ten.” 
 
 162. Given that de-equitized partners, by definition, are no longer equity partners, respondents to 
this question who reported themselves equity partners most likely were de-equitized at a different 
firm. 
Williams_62-HLJ-597 (Do Not Delete) 4/21/2011 12:19 PM 
654 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:597 
• “I was a young equity partner and had just had twins (in addition to a 
6 year old), so my time/attention to client development and marketing 
was limited. I chose to be ‘de-equitized’ as a way to balance the 
demands at the time. Ten years later, I returned to equity.” 
Note that, in both cases, the firms matched an “off-ramp” with an “on-
ramp” and gained a happy and productive partner as a result. Yet other 
respondents’ stories lacked a happy ending: 
“[Why I was de-equitized] was never fully explained to me. The head 
office instructed our office to reduce the number of equity partners, 
and I was the one chosen (during my pregnancy, even though I had 
significant revenue generation and billable hours).” 
Other personal reasons included medical issues, and one attorney 
who had undertaken a transgender transition. Still other respondents 
were de-equitized for work-related reasons: “This was my decision, as a 
way to continue working but reduce the hours and the responsibility for 
training associates and feeding work to a specific group of associates. I 
can now focus on developing business and helping in firm management 
with less concern about billable hours.” 
A few respondents clearly felt burned by their firms’ decisions to de-
equitize them. Several respondents tied decisions to de-equitize to their 
firms’ desire to increase profits per partner, or profits per equity partner: 
• “I was asked to handle a significant pro-bono [matter] and my ‘profits 
per partner’ numbers weren’t acceptable.” 
• “Our compensation system has been changing significantly in the last 
few years as profits per equity partner (versus profits per partner) is 
used by more firms to tout their finances to merger targets. It is 
becoming much harder to become an equity partner and I anticipate 
that a number of partners will be de-equitized this year. I had to fight 
like hell to avoid that last year.” 
Other scholarship has questioned whether de-equitization is a 
significant trend in law firm compensation. One recent study followed 
the attrition of 100,000 lawyers at 285 law firms.163 The report found that 
“[d]espite anecdotal evidence that partners were affected by layoffs 
through the ‘de-equitazation’ process[,] . . . we find no evidence of large 
direct effect on partners. Even at firms with the largest layoffs, partner 
attrition rates have been at standard levels throughout the process.”164 
 
 
 
 163. Paul Oyer & Scott Schaefer, What Drives Turnover and Layoffs at Large Law Firms? 15–16 
(Mar. 2, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/LegalProfession/ 
documents/oyerlayoffs.pdf. 
 164. Id. at 12. 
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II.  Where to Go from Here? 
Compensation represents a tangible expression of a person’s value. It 
defines lifestyle, position within a community, status among peers, 
friends and family, and measures the relative importance of the 
individual to the organization.165 
No wonder people care a lot about compensation. This study shows 
some strong racial and gender effects in current law firm compensation 
systems—yet changing these systems is not something one does lightly. 
Someone’s ox is always gored, which can lead to serious interfirm 
conflicts. According to Altman Weil consultant James D. Cotterman, 
“Generally it will take two or three years to move from an existing 
system to a new one.”166 
Nonetheless, a discussion of best practices is important for several 
reasons. First, this report provides some helpful guidance to women on 
how to choose their law firms: Some firms have compensation systems 
that work well for women, while others have systems that present 
significant career difficulties for at least some of their women partners. 
Before women choose their law firms, they should find out some crucial 
facts about its compensation system. 
A discussion of best practices is also important for law firms. The 
discussion below will highlight a striking conclusion: the aspects of law 
firms’ compensation systems that open the door to hidden bias—against 
lawyers of color as well as women—also have been widely criticized by 
law firm management consultants. Failing to address the problems with 
compensation systems will have a disproportionate impact both on 
women and on lawyers of color, but good management will help 
everyone—and the firm’s bottom line.167 
This Part will first address the common claim that the current design 
of law firm compensation systems simply reflects economic reality. It 
then will proceed to a discussion of best practices. 
A. Economic Reality? 
Our survey data confirm that, while many firms say they consider a 
wide range of factors in setting compensation, our study respondents 
perceive that the key factors in most law firm compensation systems are 
origination and hours worked, measured in various ways. 
Is this not just economic reality? After all, if partners do not bring in 
work, no law firm can survive. Yet many consultants believe that existing 
 
 165. Cotterman, supra note 33, at 4. 
 166. Cotterman, supra note 30, at 10. 
 167. See generally Lotte Bailyn, Breaking the Mold: Women, Men, and Time in the New 
Corporate World (1993) (describing current expectations of career success, the cost to both 
employers and employees for following these expectations, and the potential gains if this traditional 
mold could be broken). 
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compensation systems do not incentivize behavior that is in the best 
long-term interest of firms. Management guru David Maister comes out 
swinging:  
Many law firms have discovered you can make money if you work 
everybody very, very hard and really slash your costs and don’t care 
about how people—partners, associates, or staff—feel about their work 
lives. ‘Let’s succeed by working more hours and ever-decreasing 
amount of support’ is not the most sophisticated piece of business 
thinking I have ever heard.168 
Not surprisingly, others take a softer line. Notes the Vice President and 
General Counsel of Hildebrandt Baker Robbins Inc.: 
[W]hen Partner A needs help from another specialist, Partner B, 
Partner B will either expressly or implicitly refuse to give his best 
service to Partner A’s client because Partner A will collect the 
origination fee forever. Partner B figures, “I’m better off finding my 
own client, rather than working on Howard’s client.”169 
As previously discussed, Joel A. Rose, a law firm management 
consultant, highlights the perverse incentives that can plague law firm 
compensation systems: “Tensions can develop when the direction of the 
firm’s compensation system is unclear or only receives lip service.”170 He 
cites several examples: 
• When “the firm verbally encourages partners to ‘delegate client 
work to others within the firm,’ but, in practice, it overcompensates 
for revenue collected from partners’ personal production . . . .”171 
• When “the firm verbally encourages partners to work together to 
develop business from existing and potential clients but rewards 
individuals at the expense of joint origination credit . . . .”172 
• When “the firm verbally encourages partners to perform 
consequential nonbillable work to progress the firm (e.g., 
marketing, enhancing the firm’s image, training, management of the 
firm and its substantive practice areas, etc.) but rewards those 
activities marginally in favor of billable hours/revenue from 
personal production.”173 
Compensation systems that focus on origination also give partners 
incentives to bring in clients “regardless of client quality, not only in 
terms of putting the firm at greater risk of claims, but also at greater odds 
of writing off fees. Since D gets a share as originator without doing the 
 
 168.  David Maister, Are Law Firms Manageable?, Am. L., Apr. 2006, at 96, 100. 
 169. Compensation: A Law Firm’s Pandora’s Box: Origination, Profitability and Hours Worked All 
Add Up, Merrill’s Ill. Legal Times, Sept. 1996, available at 1996 WLNR 6402767 (quoting Joel F. 
Henning, Senior Vice President and General Counsel of Hildebrandt Baker Robbins Inc.). 
 170.  Rose, supra note 62, at 3. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 3–4. 
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work, the write-off falls disproportionately on those doing the work.”174 
Peter J. Winders, a partner with Carlton Fields in Florida, is particularly 
harsh in his criticism of origination credit: 
Make a rule that Brown, the corporate lawyer, cannot dabble in 
litigation. Thus, Brown is theoretically forbidden from handling the 
litigation, but if he goes ahead and does it anyway, he is rewarded for 
doing so. Unworthy clients are to be avoided, but compensation is paid 
for originating one. Crime does in fact pay, but one person is appointed 
as cop to keep him from doing it. And of course since the cop work is 
underpaid (it is non-billable, and not provided for in the system) there 
is a temptation to do it only sporadically. It is like hoping to stop the 
importation of drugs from Columbia [sic] by decreasing penalties and 
manning law enforcement with unpaid volunteers.175 
Winders also highlights the perverse incentives that stem from a focus on 
partners’ billable hours. Each partner “is tempted to favor ‘his own’ 
clients, so long as he has plenty to do . . . [over] stepchilding” his 
partners’ clients’ work, even if that is of greater long-term value to the 
firm.176 
Consultants warn that an excessive focus on long work hours 
incentivizes behavior harmful both to clients and to law firms.177 When 
firms place too much emphasis on partners’ billable hours, partners lack 
sufficient motivation to “develop and delegate client work to others 
within and outside their area of expertise,” notes Rose.178 He continues:  
Most firms that place a premium on revenue from partners’ personal 
production find that partners tend to hold their client relationships too 
close to their vests, they frequently hoard client work rather than 
spread it around to other partners . . . partners perform work that 
could be performed by associates . . . partners do billable work when 
their better use for the law firm is to generate additional business from 
existing and potential clients, and lawyers may perform work outside 
their princip[al] areas of expertise that others in the firm could perform 
more effectively and efficiently.179  
Another consultant, Michael J. Anderson, notes “liability risks when 
partners perform work in areas in which they are not proficient,”180 while 
another author has argued that the structural conflicts of interests set up 
 
 174.  Peter J. Winders, The Ideal Law Firm Compensation System, 16 Prof. Law, no. 2, 2005 at 1, 5. 
 175. Id. at 4–5. See generally Steven Kerr, On the Folly of Rewarding A, While Hoping for B, 
18 Acad. Mgmt. J. 769 (1975) (discussing reward systems that reward discouraged behaviors, while 
failing to reward desired behaviors). 
 176.  Winders, supra note 174, at 4. 
 177.  See, e.g., Rose, supra note 63, at 5; Winders, supra note 174, at 7. 
 178. Cf. Rose, supra note 63, at 5 (explaining that rewarding partners billing and collecting for 
work for which they are the responsible partner, but not the originating partner, motivates them to 
develop and delegate work inside and outside their area). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Michael J. Anderson, Edge Int’l, Partner Compensation: Systems Used in Professional 
Service Firms 8 (2001).  
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by current compensation systems place lawyers at risk of violating the 
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.181 
Our respondents reported a variety of perverse incentives at work in 
their firms. One noted that a high billable hours requirement can lead to 
padding of bills: “The high billable hour requirement encourages 
padding . . . . It’s a system with few realistic incentives other than to work 
yourself silly or lie about it.” More common were reports of client 
hoarding: 
• “Several senior partners have retired in the past five years and the 
work simply went away—no one had planned for succession, in my 
view because the partners were busy hoarding credit to advance their 
careers, and not to look at either the client’s interests or the law firm’s. 
Dysfunctional compensation systems can really cripple a firm.” 
• “After seeing the two systems at work, it seems to be that lock-step is 
much fairer to women. There is substantially less hoarding of clients, 
exclusion from contacts, elbowing women out once the client gets in 
the door (after we’re trotted out for appearance of diversity).” 
• “I have expressed my dissatisfaction with the compensation system, 
which I believe encourages partners to hoard work, not to develop 
teams and not to institutionalize clients.” 
Other respondents identified other behaviors not in the long-term 
interest of their firms: 
• “As a minority female, I am clearly in an outer circle, and at the mercy 
of others. Efforts have been made to thwart my business development 
in my respective practice group. It is very frustrating.” 
• “[The b]illing partner is said not to matter at all, except that there is a 
trend, since this is a multi-office firm, of writing off time of lawyers in 
other offices and otherwise gaming the system, and this is the power of 
the billing partner. So while the ‘status’ is not said to be important, the 
position is important nonetheless.” 
Some consultants fault compensation systems that focus on 
origination and personal production for focusing on revenue, rather than 
on the bottom line. Such systems stress cash flow over cost controls and 
ignore the need to incentivize the investments necessary to ensure long-
term viability of a business organization.182 The failure to value the kinds 
of human capital and management activities that are vital to the long-
 
 181. Edward A. Bernstein, Structural Conflicts of Interest: How A Law Firm’s Compensation 
System Affects Its Ability to Serve Clients, 2003 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1261, 1262 (arguing that the shift away 
from lockstep sets up incentives that can cause partners to give poor legal advice). 
 182. John W. Olmstead, Cutting the Pie, Determining Partner Compensation, Olmstead & Assocs. 
(2005), http://www.olmsteadassoc.com/resource-center/determining-partner-compensation.aspx 
(“Compensation systems should do more than simply allocate the pie—they should reinforce the 
behaviors and efforts that the firm seeks from its attorneys. Many firms are discovering that desired 
behaviors and results must go beyond short term fee production and must include contributions in 
areas such as marketing, mentoring, firm management, etc. to ensure the long term viability of the 
firm.”). 
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term vitality of a business organization is apparent from the responses to 
the survey. Many firms now operate on a modified “eat what you kill” 
system, which in its pure form, notes Anderson, results in 
a total lack of responsibility for managing the entity. Because no one 
gets recognition for non-billable time spent there is often a void when 
it comes to firm management, training of juniors, firm marketing or 
human resources . . . . The system creates no need for collegiality other 
than as a method for partners to market other partners for work for 
their clients.183 
As noted above, even law firm and practice group management are rated 
far below the individual profit-center factors. Other forms of institutional 
investment play little, if any, role in law firm compensation. 
“The most advanced method is to look at how groups are 
performing,” says Cotterman.184 “You need some element of compensation 
that recognizes group success and performance. You want to make sure 
compensation rewards collaboration.”185 Our data indicate that this trend 
is still in the birthing stage. Some comments signaled it, as when one 
respondent reported that “associate profit of the practice group/office” 
was part of the compensation formula. Yet only 4% of income partners 
and 11% of equity partners felt that teamwork was very important in 
determining compensation. More progress is evident if one widens the 
scope of inquiry: 32% of income partners and 46% of equity partners felt 
that teamwork was “important” or “very important.” Yet both figures 
trailed measures reflective of hours worked and origination by a very 
wide margin. Even more striking, from an economic standpoint, is how 
rarely “effective leveraging of associates” plays a role in law firm 
compensation. This is, of course, vital both from the viewpoint of the 
firm, to enhance profitability, and from the viewpoint of clients, to 
ensure cost-effectiveness. Yet rewarding leveraging remains rare: It is 
virtually never a major factor in setting compensation and was listed as 
“important” or “very important” by fewer than half of our respondents. 
A bit more progress is evident in redesigning origination credits to 
incentivize teamwork. Roughly one-third of respondents noted that 
cross-selling and/or expanding work for an existing client is a very 
important factor. This trend is even stronger if we widen the inquiry: 
84% of equity partners and roughly three-fourths (77%) of income 
partners listed these activities as either “important” or “very important” 
in the setting of compensation. It thus seems that law firms are well on 
their way to encouraging teamwork with respect to gaining clients, but 
 
 183. Anderson, supra note 180, at 11. 
 184. Telephone Interview with James D. Cotterman, Consultant, Altman Weil, Inc. (Feb. 24, 
2009). 
 185. Id. 
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they have a long way to go in incentivizing teamwork with respect to 
servicing clients. 
Another problem with the design of law firm compensation systems 
is the undervaluing of long-term investments. Peter Winders highlights 
the perverse incentives that arise when “nobody is paid for minding the 
store.” Partners are incentivized to  
avoid committee assignments, recruiting interviews and other time 
consuming duties that benefit the firm because they do not benefit him 
monetarily. He can then claim he brings in more money than anybody, 
ignoring, as the formula does, the fact that the other duties are 
essential if the firm is to thrive.186 
One point that does not appear in the consultant literature, but is 
suggested by our survey, is that the attrition of women partners, which is 
higher than that of male partners, is sometimes linked with the 
perception of gender bias in compensation. Said one respondent: 
“A key motivating factor in my decision to leave the firm was that I 
learned that my base salary and bonus were lower than those of a male 
peer (same law school graduating class, similar prior work experience, 
similar expertise, same practice group) despite the fact that my work 
product was consistently in demand and I was consistently busy, 
whereas he had trouble maintaining a solid workload and many 
partners expressed concerns about the quality of his work.” 
Of course, when a partner leaves, she takes her book of business with 
her. This is a cost of current compensation practices at some firms that 
has, to our knowledge, never been noted in the literature. 
If the long-term economic viability of law firms does not explain 
contemporary law firm compensation systems, what does explain them? 
We posed that question to James J. Sandman. He first addressed the 
overvaluation of hours worked: “Rainmakers make the argument all the 
time, ‘Measuring me in terms of the hours I work doesn’t make sense—
that’s not the best use of my time.’”187 The reason partners’ billable hours 
survive has to do with lawyers’ skill sets. Rainmaking skills are not 
equally distributed across the lawyer population. Other partners can 
generate revenue for the firm more easily by working a lot of hours. The 
many risk-averse partners who do not want to gamble their 
compensation on their business-generating success feel that maximizing 
their billable hours as service partners gives them more control over and 
certainty about their compensation.188 
The result, Sandman continued, is that 
certain things the firm needs in the long term are not valued. The trend 
in partner compensation is toward trying to measure the individual 
partner’s economic contribution to the firm. This tends to devalue less 
 
 186. Winders, supra note 174, at 4. 
 187. Telephone Interview with James J. Sandman, supra note 95. 
 188. Id. 
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tangible but nevertheless important attributes that are not easily 
measured. Teamwork? A partner who cites that as his or her best 
argument for compensation would be considered a lame advocate.189 
In summary, many commentators feel that current compensation 
systems overvalue individual cash flow measures and undervalue 
institutional investment measures. Our data indicate some movement 
away from compensation systems that create incentives mismatched with 
firms’ long-term strategic goals. Yet the key features that have been 
widely criticized by consultants as creating perverse incentives remain 
robust in the law firms of our respondents. 
B. Best Practices 
This study suggests that many law firms could benefit from changes 
to their compensation systems. Such changes are not easy: Abrupt and 
controversial changes to a firm’s compensation system can easily lead the 
firm to break up. Yet gradual progress towards fairer and more effective 
compensation practices is, in the opinion of many of our respondents, 
clearly needed. These include: 
1.  Increasing transparency; 
2.  Benchmarking; 
3.  Improving diversity on compensation committees and introducing 
other checks on bias and in-group favoritism; 
4.  Examining the billable hours threshold; 
5.  Redesigning the origination credit; 
6.  Creating a diverse committee that handles disputes over reward 
allocation, particularly origination credit; 
7.  Taking proactive steps to check the hidden bias that will 
otherwise surely emerge in the context of compensation systems; 
8.  Ensuring a process that does not penalize women for self-
advocacy; and 
9. Conforming to standard business practices by linking 
compensation to individuals’ contributions to the long-term 
viability of the firm. 
1. Increasing Transparency 
The path to becoming a billing partner is varied, with inconsistencies, 
and there is no official guidance as to how one becomes a billing 
partner. Sometimes it is just who gets the file open first; sometimes it is 
the partner with the most political clout. . . . There is no consistency 
and no one to turn to for guidance; there are no rules. Yet this is 
[important] to the overall determination of partner compensation. 
A system that is not clearly and formally explained to everyone 
means that, to gain the knowledge necessary to understand the system, 
 
 189. Id. 
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one needs to rely on informal networks and relationships with people in 
power. This situation will disadvantage out-groups, which in most law 
firms means that it will disadvantage disproportionate numbers of 
women and people of color. Informal, opaque systems also will 
disadvantage many white men who are too shy or introverted to know 
the right people and the ropes. 
A best practice is to write a memo that explains clearly how a firm’s 
compensation system works, and provides for each new partner an 
introductory session with an existing partner-mentor to explain the 
system and to answer questions. Of course, the partner-mentor needs to 
be someone who actually understands the compensation system: As our 
survey indicates, many partners do not. 
When the compensation system is changed, this also needs to be 
clearly explained. This probably will be best handled in small meetings: 
In large meetings, people will be reluctant to ask questions, and one-on-
one meetings are likely to yield inconsistency in the information given.190 
A more basic point is that firms need to understand what factors 
actually play a major role in a firm’s compensation—to talk about 
realities rather than aspirations. Gaining this information often will 
require a statistical analysis to identify what those factors are, as opposed 
to what factors are announced to have an influence. This kind of 
statistical analysis typically will require an outside consultant—but this is 
a type of analysis familiar to consultants who specialize in compensation 
systems. 
A final point is that firms need to understand whether those factors 
that play an important role in elevation to partnership are different from 
those factors that play an important role in setting partner compensation. 
If different factors have more influence on setting partner compensation 
than on elevation to partnership, firms need to inform new partners of 
this fact. Again, formalizing this kind of information process can avoid 
in-group favoritism—where “those in the know” succeed, while those 
who are not in the know tend to fail. Allowing in-group favoritism to 
flourish will disadvantage not only women, but also people of color, 
LGBT lawyers, and perhaps others. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 190. E-mail from James J. Sandman to Joan C. Williams (Apr. 4, 2010, 6:43 PM) (on file with 
Author). 
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2. Benchmarking 
The system is effectively feudal. Compensation is centralized with a 
very small group of partners. Because voting is weighted, the firm chair 
knows exactly how many votes he needs to control the firm and he 
pays the top tier enough to buy their loyalty. The dominant factor is 
origination credit, but there are virtually no rules or guidelines and so 
credit is a free for all, with the strongest usually winning. 
A first step is to establish baseline information on the percentage of 
revenues and/or profits generated by, and credited to, women lawyers 
and lawyers of color.191 The second, and perhaps most important step is 
to implement regular monitoring and analysis of the impact of a given 
compensation system on out-groups, including women and people of 
color.192 
This type of benchmarking is important in order to control the kind 
of biases that occur even in organizations where good intentions abound. 
A recent study of a business with an elaborate performance evaluation 
process, and a strong commitment to merit-based compensation systems, 
found that women and people of color nonetheless got lower raises when 
supervisors took the evaluations and awarded raises, without a process to 
check for bias at that step of the process.193 
To quote a well-known phrase, “what gets measured gets done.”194 
To put this differently, “[i]f you’re not keeping score, you’re only 
practicing.”195 If systematic differentials in compensation by race and/or 
sex emerge, further steps can be initiated. Given the wide range in 
different types of compensation systems, probably the best advice is to 
call in a consultant to analyze where the problems arise and how best to 
address them. 
3. Improving Diversity on Compensation Committees and 
Introducing Other Checks on Bias and In-Group Favoritism 
In our respondents’ firms, the committees in charge of 
compensation were remarkably white, and remarkably male. This creates 
the perfect conditions for in-group favoritism, which systematically 
disadvantages women and people of color of both sexes. It is important 
to note that having a single woman or a single person of color on a 
committee often increases the risk of creating the unhealthy dynamics 
 
 191. Nat’l Ass’n of Women Lawyers, Actions for Advancing Women Into Law Firm 
Leadership: Report of the NAWL National Leadership Summit 20 (July 2008) [hereinafter NAWL, 
Summit Report]. 
 192. Bielby, supra note 46, at 126 (detailing the need for such monitoring). 
 193. Emilio J. Castilla, Gender, Race, and Meritocracy in Organization Careers, 113 Am. J. Soc. 
1479, 1482 (2008). 
 194. Maureen Giovannini, What Gets Measured Gets Done: Achieving Results Through Diversity 
and Inclusion, 27 J. for Quality & Participation 21, 26 (2004). 
 195. Oral Communication with James Potter, Senior Vice President, Gen. Counsel, and Sec’y of 
Del Monte Foods, and Chair of the Advisory Board of Project for Attorney Retention (Spring 2009). 
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associated with tokenism. For example, when only one woman is on an 
important committee, her sex can become so salient that she may feel the 
need to judge women more harshly to prove that she is not favoring 
women. Or she may feel that every time she opens her mouth her 
comments are taken as representing all women. A variety of dynamics 
can emerge.196 In short, heterogeneous committees can provide a break in 
bias. 
The fact that many committees in charge of compensation are 
elected may contribute to those committees’ lack of diversity. In this 
context, it is worth noting that many respondents said that although the 
committee in charge of compensation, in theory, is elected, in practice, 
the election typically rubber-stamped candidates that have already been 
chosen by the powers that be.197 One useful approach, if that firm has a 
separate compensation committee, may be for the management 
committee to propose a diverse slate of candidates for the compensation 
committee. 
A final practice that exists in some firms can help reduce in-group 
favoritism in the operation of compensation committees: the rule that no 
partner’s compensation can rise more than 10% while he or she is serving 
on the comp committee.198 Said Barbara Caufield, equity partner at 
Dewey & LeBoeuf, “We used to do this. I don’t know why we ever 
stopped. It was very effective in ensuring that nobody stayed too long on 
the compensation committee!”199 
4. Examining the Billable Hours Threshold 
 NAWL’s 2007 study found that a high billable hours requirement 
is correlated with a dramatic increase in the wage gap between men and 
women.200 The gender gap was $140,000 at firms with high hours 
requirements, $73,000 at firms with no hours requirement, and $51,000 at 
firms that required partners to log billable hours lower than the median 
for all firms.201 
Billable hours inevitably play a significant role in the level of 
partner compensation. Yet two different models exist for taking billable 
hours into account. One requires all partners to meet a certain billable-
hours threshold in order to receive all the credit available for the 
billable-hours component of attorney compensation, on the theory that 
billable hours are only one type of contribution partners need to make 
for firms to flourish. The other system rewards the attorneys who work 
 
 196. Kanter, supra note 41, at 238–40. 
 197. Telephone Interview with Cathy Salvatore, Dir. of Career Dev. (Mar. 5, 2010). 
 198. Personal Communication with Barbara Caufield, Partner, Dewey & LeBeouf (Mar. 18, 2010). 
 199. Id. 
 200. Nat’l Ass’n of Women Lawyers, National Survey on Retention and Promotion of 
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 201. Id. 
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the most hours, signaling that billing hours is a critical contribution to a 
firm’s long-term financial viability. 
The threshold approach to billable hours was used in only a small 
minority of our respondents’ firms. The predominant system presumably 
was one in which attorneys who work the longest hours tend to receive 
increased compensation even if, for example, a partner could be 
increasing a firm’s profitability more by leveraging associates better, 
decreasing unwanted attrition among valued attorneys, or moving from 
lower- to higher-margin practice areas. Because many more men than 
women have two-person careers in which they can rely on their partner 
to take care of all matters outside of work,202 a most-hours-wins systems 
disproportionately disadvantages women partners. In addition, in the 
opinion of many law firm consultants, systems focused heavily on billable 
hours are more than just not economically justified, they also introduce 
perverse incentives, most notably the hoarding of work, and 
inefficiencies that are detrimental to clients’ interests. 
5. Redesigning the Origination Credit 
Sixty percent of firms in the survey do not formally award 
origination credit. Yet even in firms without formal origination credit, 
origination often plays a central role in the setting of law firm 
compensation. Old-fashioned origination credit could usefully be 
redesigned in a number of ways: 
Origination credit should not be inheritable. If the purpose of 
origination credit is to incentivize lawyers to bring in new clients, it is 
hard to discern the rationale for allowing the partner who “owns” the 
client to pass on origination credit to whomever he or she wants. This 
practice has negative effects both on diversity and on the perceived 
fairness of a firm’s compensation system. 
Reward teams, not individuals. The point of a law firm is to build 
teams of lawyers that, together, can serve a client’s interests better than a 
sole practitioner could.203 As noted above, consultants often advocate 
systems that recognize a variety of contributions to a given client’s work. 
One step in this direction is the common practice of dividing credit 
among three or more attorneys: the one who brought in the work, the 
billing partner, the partner who manages the client relationship, and the 
partners who actually do the work. Obviously, if the weight given to 
origination credit swamps the other factors considered, the resulting 
system will differ little from old-fashioned origination credit. Another 
alternative is to shift away from origination credit, towards an analysis of 
whose work currently binds a given client to the firm. Fewer than one-in-
five majority equity partners and only roughly one-in-six income partners 
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 203. See Burk & McGowan, supra note 10, at 64–67. 
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and minority equity partners reported this kind of system when asked 
which factors were considered “very important” in setting compensation. 
Yet a majority of firms appear to already be engaged in this calculation: 
66% of majority equity partners, 63% of minority equity partners, 60% 
of majority income partners and 45% of minority income partners said 
this factor was either “important” or “very important.” 
Origination credit by matter, not by client. A complementary practice 
is to reward origination credit according to who brings in a given matter, 
rather than to who first introduced the client to the firm. Another 
recommended practice is that any expansion of the work goes not to first 
contact, but rather to the expander and spread among the other 
secondary actors. This type of distribution is important because women 
and minorities are more likely to be expanders than first contacts. 
Sunsets. Some firms have a three-year sunset on origination credit. 
“At that point,” said Alan R. Olson of Altman Weil, “either new 
business credit ceases or is reduced. Other compensation credits, such as 
billing attorney credit and working attorney credit, would remain in most 
systems and palliate the abrupt reduction in new business credit.”204 
Sunsets recognize the importance of origination, while also ensuring that 
different lawyers have relationships with a given client, to ensure that the 
client stays with the firm even if a single attorney on the team serving the 
client leaves. 
Pitch credit. A pervasive complaint by both women and people of 
color is that they are invited on pitches in order to appeal to in-house 
departments that seek diversity—but then are given no origination credit 
for doing so. This could be eliminated by a clearly stated and widely 
disseminated policy to the effect that, if a woman or person of color is 
invited on a client pitch, that attorney needs to be given part of any 
origination credit that results from the pitch—and part of the work. 
6. Creating a Diverse Committee That Handles Disputes over 
Reward Allocation, Particularly Origination Credit 
Not only the system of reward allocation, but also the process for 
settling disputes, can make a tremendous difference for women and 
people of color. This study shows clearly that the current system, in 
which origination credit contests are left to be negotiated privately 
between the contesting partners is having a highly negative effect on 
many women and attorneys of color. This is precisely the kind of 
context—out of the public eye, with no oversight whatsoever—in which 
hidden bias flourishes. NAWL recommends that firms establish “a 
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powerful and diverse oversight committee” charged with resolving 
disputes over origination credit.205 
7. Taking Proactive Steps to Check the Hidden Bias That Will 
Otherwise Surely Emerge in the Context of Compensation 
Systems 
The first step is to look very carefully at law firm compensation 
systems that are totally subjective. While these may work well in some 
small firms, they present very serious risks of gender and racial bias. 
These systems also has serious drawbacks from a business standpoint, 
which is why, as one consulting firms notes delicately, “Altman Weil’s 
consultants find it difficult to justify totally subjective systems.”206 If a 
firm has a totally subjective system, benchmarking to assess whether it is 
creating racial and gender disparities is even more important. 
Even where a firm’s system is not totally subjective, subjectivity is 
an inevitable part of most firms’ compensation systems. If biases are 
unmonitored and unchecked, both women and attorneys of color often 
will find themselves having to “try twice as hard” to make half as much. 
This occurs, as noted above, because the successes of women (and the 
literature is much the same with respect to people of color207) will tend to 
be overlooked or attributed to quirks of fate, while evidence of their 
failures and limitations will tend to be noticed, remembered, and 
interpreted as evidence of lack of merit. Again, this will happen even 
when the individuals in a given firm have no hostility or ill-will towards 
women or people of color, and believe, in good faith, that they are 
sincerely committed to advancing women and attorneys of color.208 
Luckily, employers can institute practices that control for cognitive 
bias.209 The goal is not to eliminate bias—which is impossible—but to 
teach people what assumptions they need to double-check. An efficient 
way to accomplish this in a law firm setting is to require a short training 
in the context of performance evaluation, given each year, to introduce 
the four basic patterns of gender stereotyping: 
1. Prove It Again! When women have to prove their competence 
over and over again in order to be judged as competent as men. 
 
 205. NAWL, Summit Report, supra note 191, at 20. 
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2. Catch-22: When women face social pressure to play a limited 
number of traditionally feminine roles—and encounter pushback 
if they do not. Research shows that, too often, women who 
conform to traditional roles are liked but not respected, while 
women who do not conform are respected but not liked. This is 
important for all attorneys, because they all weigh in on others’ 
advancement and compensation—be it of associates or partners. 
3. Maternal Wall: When motherhood triggers strong assumptions 
that women are no longer committed or competent. 
4. Gender Wars: When gender bias against women turns into 
conflicts among the women. 
The committee that decides compensation needs additional training to 
ensure that they do not penalize women for self-promotion, do not 
discount women’s successes, do not award men more compensation 
“because they have a family to support,” or award women less 
compensation “because they have someone to support them.” Many 
programs and consultants are available to provide this training. Another 
important resource is the ABA Commission’s Fair Measure: Toward 
Effective Attorney Evaluations.210 
In addition, studies show that procedures that require the formal 
articulation of reasons for a decision provide a check on bias, because 
people stop and self-check to examine their assumptions.211 This 
recommendation poses a challenge for compensation systems that 
traditionally have operated in the closet. Unfortunately, that kind of 
decisionmaking opens the door wide to unexamined bias, particularly in 
an environment in which there are relatively few women, people of color, 
or other diverse attorneys. The literature also stresses that putting 
someone in charge of diversity who has access to leadership is the single 
most effective way to achieve diversity.212 
A minimum first step is to introduce a formal metric, formally 
disseminated, that reports the breakdown of women and people of color 
in tiers of compensation. This will no doubt be a controversial proposal 
but, again, “if you’re not keeping score, you’re only practicing.”213 
8. Ensuring a Process That Does Not Penalize Women for Self-
Advocacy 
In firms with effective performance evaluation training, partners will 
soon learn that penalizing women for self-promoting when men are not 
penalized for the same conduct is gender bias. Firms that fail to do so, at 
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the very least, need to make partners aware that their instincts may be to 
find distasteful in women the kind of self-promotion they take for 
granted in men. Again, implicit bias will inevitably be a factor affecting 
law firm compensation of women and attorneys of color unless and until 
the firm makes its partners aware of the need to recognize the kinds of 
patterns that commonly arise and to self-correct when they do so. 
As noted above, women are often sanctioned for self-advocacy, 
particularly by other women. One way to address this is to issue a 
memorandum that delineates what is expected and encouraged during 
self-advocacy interactions, outlining the type of information required, 
and describing what is inappropriate. It is important to have female as 
well as male partners discuss this, given that studies show that women 
actually are more likely than are men to sanction a woman for self-
promotion.214 The key is to have the partners who are deciding 
compensation ask: What is my reaction—and would my reaction be the 
same if partner ABC (a male partner at the woman partner’s level, not 
just an anonymous man) had written the same thing? 
9. Conforming to Standard Business Practices by Linking 
Compensation to Individuals’ Contributions to the Long-Term 
Viability of the Firm 
An important point, rarely mentioned, is the current system’s odd 
focus on current cash flow. To state the obvious, cash flow differs from 
the bottom line, which is a measure of the difference between revenue 
flow and expenses. Consultants circle around this when they note that 
partners in practice areas with higher profit margins should be rewarded 
financially.215 To quote Joel F. Henning Senior Vice President and 
General Counsel of Hildebrandt Baker Robbins, Inc: “[v]ery often the 
celebrity lawyers . . . will . . . say ‘[t]hey’re not paying me enough money. 
I brought in $2 million worth of business.’ I’ll look into it and I’ll often 
find that it costs $3 million to bring in that $2 million worth of 
business.”216 He also states: “If you measure hours, receipts and 
originations, that doesn’t take into account whether the work is profitable 
or not.”217 
Of course, cash flow is easier to measure than bottom line. A 
particular challenge faced by law firms is that those who manage them 
typically have had no training in how to manage a large business 
organization, nor do most law firm partners have an appreciation for 
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what they did not learn when they chose not to go to business school.218 
The past lack of sophisticated management feeds skepticism about the 
potential for sophisticated management in the future.219 The result, notes 
Maister, is an absence of trust that leads to “extremely short-term 
orientations of many law firms. If partners don’t believe the firm will 
remember or value their contributions to future success, why would they 
make any investment that they may ultimately not get credit for?”220 
The basic principle is easy to articulate: “Compensation theory 
generally says that you ought to be rewarding people for the behaviors 
that you are trying to elicit . . . ,” notes Henning.221 The typical approach 
in most business settings is to link compensation to the individual’s 
annual goals, which in turn reflect the organization’s strategic plan.222 
One survey respondent noted that her firm had instituted such a system 
outside of the compensation context: “Individual must meet the specific 
written elevation criteria and reflect/support standards set forth in the 
firm’s strategic plan.” When asked about what factors into compensation, 
other comments offer intriguing hints of systems designed to reward 
teamwork: “Cross-office fertilization (ability to generate work for 
lawyers in other offices); ability to generate marketing and billable 
opportunities for lawyers in other practice groups.” 
Law firms’ failure to link partners’ compensation to their 
contribution to the long-term viability of the firm has a disproportionate 
impact on women, for several reasons. Most important, women lawyers 
often are under significant informal pressures to make such 
contributions, for example, through service on committees related to 
recruitment, associate development, and diversity. In addition, due to a 
history of gender discrimination in the profession, women may feel a 
greater obligation than do men to mentor other women, and to help 
them develop their careers—contributions that help develop a firm’s 
human capital but rarely play a significant role when partner 
compensation is set. 
A straightforward fix is for firms to reward all of the different kinds 
of contributions partners are asked to make to the firm, both through 
mentoring and other programs, and as well as through committee work. 
This theory of compensation would recognize that if the firm requires 
partners to make a contribution, it is important enough to the long-term 
future of the firm to be recognized when compensation is set. The 
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inverse would also be true—that if a given type of contribution is not 
important enough to recognize when compensation is set, perhaps it is 
not important enough to be required. 
How these factors are taken into account also matters. For example, 
we suspect that most firms represented by lawyers in our survey say that 
they take into account, in setting compensation, partners’ contributions 
to diversity, associate development, and so on. Yet many of our 
respondents were notably skeptical; evidently, many felt that their firms 
paid lip service to but did not actually account for such activities to a 
significant extent when compensation was set. This finding may indicate 
that firms need to communicate better how they actually do take these 
types of contributions into account. Alternatively, firms may need to set 
up more formal systems than they currently have; it may be that existing 
informal recognition (“it’s in the mix; we just don’t quantify it”) 
translates good intentions into few results. 
More sweeping than a mechanism for adding additional factors into 
the mix in setting law firm compensation is to shift to the type of 
compensation systems adopted long ago. For example, Ernst & Young’s 
compensation system weighs partners in four different arenas: quality, 
people, markets, and operational excellence.223 
“Quality” is, quite simply, the quality of the partners’ work—
something rarely considered explicitly in law firm compensation 
systems.224 At Ernst & Young, detailed assessments of quality are 
performed for each major “engagement,” as client matters are called.225 
“People” concerns whether a partner is “actively involved in 
attracting growing and training our people,” said Cathy Salvatore, 
Director of Career Development, “because our people are the only thing 
we have.”226 Partners can choose how they will contribute to human 
capital development of others in the firm: “I tell them, these are the 
people who are going to pay for your retirement,” Salvatore said.227 Some 
partners choose to focus on recruiting, whether recruiting recent law 
school graduates or more experienced attorneys.228 Individuals are given 
responsibility for recruiting from their alma maters.229 “They own it. It is 
their responsibility to see that we get what we need, and to make sure the 
relevant professors are happy.”230 Other partners focus on inclusiveness 
and diversity, or serve as Service Program leaders, teaching in-house 
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training programs, and recruiting others to do so.231 Also included is how 
a partner interacts with his or her team: “How are they going to engage 
with people on the job? It is very easy for a partner to never be on the 
scene—to come in at the beginning, at the end, and other than that only 
if there’s a problem. Younger people love to see the partners,” Salvatore 
noted.232 But a partner who spent all his or her time with an engagement 
team, who was totally invisible at office events and “was not driving 
anything cross functionally” would be penalized under the “People” 
category.233 The focus is on strategic development: “[H]ow are you 
contributing to what E & Y needs to do to make sure we have the 
strongest workforce, period—across all accounts not just your 
account.”234 A single respondent reported a law-firm system that reflects 
some of these concerns: Her firm’s partner compensation took account of 
associate evaluations of partners. 
“Markets” includes revenue generated, but goes far beyond that: It 
measures the extent to which a partner engaged in strategic development 
of new markets—not only for him or herself, but also for the firm as a 
whole.235 Markets also measures whether the partner has brought in 
work, and worked strategically to penetrate new markets or develop new 
products.236 One consideration is “account planning—how you prepare to 
get your teams ready to deliver whatever service has been contracted 
for,” Salvatore noted.237 It also includes strategic work to penetrate a new 
market: “Who are we going to go after and how are we going to go after 
them.”238 
“Operational excellence” focuses on whether work is performed 
and revenues are collected efficiently and in a timely manner.239 So, if a 
partner has “a lot of days of revenue sitting uncollected,” or has a 
significant number of write-offs, this would show up in the operational 
excellence metric.240 Also considered is “fee-sharing”: efficient 
deployment of the person with the relevant skill set, who is closest to the 
geographical locale of the engagement. “This discourages partners from 
using people they know over and over again because it may be more 
cost-efficient to use someone closer to the client,” said Salvatore.241 
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A straightforward approach would be to adopt this kind of system: 
Law firms who inquire will find that many of their larger clients have a 
similar system. Firms that feel this is too large a leap could adapt their 
current systems by awarding points for a variety of institutional 
investments (from management to developing the firm’s human capital). 
A third alternative is to set aside a specific percentage of firm profits to 
be distributed based on institutional investments. 
Conclusion 
No compensation system is perfect. But some are awful.242 
In 1960, only 38 U.S. law firms had over 50 lawyers.243 The largest 
law firm in the United States had only 169 lawyers in 1968.244 Between 
1998 and 2004, the only size category of law firms that increased 
appreciably were the largest firms: The number of attorneys working for 
these firms doubled during that period.245 By 2008, the average AmLaw 
100 firm had 778 lawyers and 183 equity partners; the average AmLaw 
200 firm had 289 and 92 equity partners.246 
As law firms have transitioned into the twenty-first century, systems 
that served the profession well thirty or sixty years ago are no longer 
working well.247 The Great Recession has exacerbated many of the 
tensions surrounding law firm compensation by making a broad swath of 
law firm partners feel at risk. Several studies have substantiated this fear 
and its impact on women, including a survey conducted by Paul Oyer and 
Scott Schaefer, which followed over 100,000 lawyers between 2008 and 
2009.248 Their findings indicated that “being female increased the 
turnover rate by about 7.5%.”249 However, the trend did not start with 
the beginning of the Great Recession. In their study, Reichman and 
Sterling recall an interview with a woman partner, who began to notice 
gender inequities in partner compensation in the 1980s and “brought 
them to the attention of the management committee, who were 
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‘appalled. They had never thought about it . . . .’”250 They introduced 
diversity training, but, for those not at the top,  
[I]t didn’t get better. . . . I think that the reason . . . . [is that those who 
took over were] people [who] tended to be about my age who in some 
ways were more threatened by the women being there than the older 
partners had been. And who in some ways were more competitive with 
everybody including the women and in some ways who saw success by 
a woman as somehow diminishing them.251 
The bad news is that existing law firm compensation systems open 
the door to gender bias, because they contain tremendous amounts of 
subjectivity and lack transparency, and because so much of the 
negotiation surrounding origination credit takes place out of sight. In a 
profession in which 90% of women lawyers report having encountered 
sex discrimination—a percentage that has not decreased since the early 
years of women’s entry into the legal profession in the late 1970s—these 
practices open the door wide to bias and discrimination.252 
Yet, if that is the bad news, the good news is that many of the 
aspects of law firm compensation that present the greatest difficulties for 
women are the same elements that knowledgeable management 
consultants have identified as outdated and/or not in the best long-term 
interests of today’s new, larger law firms. Changing law firms’ 
compensation systems will not only help diversity, it will enhance the 
economic robustness of law firms. 
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Appendix 
Minority partners were as likely as majority partners to be in one-
tier partnership systems. Approximately 30% of majority and minority 
partners were in firms with one-tier partnership systems. 
Roughly two-thirds of majority equity partners’ (70%) and minority 
income and equity partners’ (63% and 68%), but only 54% of majority 
income partners’ firms used a compensation systems based on levels or 
points. In most such systems, the levels or points are reevaluated 
annually: 80% of majority equity partners, 71% of majority income 
partners, 75% of minority income partners, and 82% of minority equity 
partners reported this practice. The remaining firms, with one exception, 
reevaluated every two years: 14% of majority equity partners, 10% of 
minority, and 4% of majority income partners reported this practice. 
Most majority equity partners (76%) reported open compensation 
systems, where partnership compensation is disclosed and circulated, 5% 
reported closed systems, and 14% reported semi-open systems, where 
compensation is available but is not distributed automatically. Among 
our majority income-partner respondents, only 48% reported open 
systems, while 26% reported closed and 20% semi-closed systems. 
Minority partners were in the middle, with 48% reporting open systems, 
22% reporting closed systems, and 23% reporting semi-open systems. 
Comments indicate that open compensation systems typically are open 
only for equity partners. 
Williams_62-HLJ-597 (Do Not Delete) 4/21/2011 12:19 PM 
676 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:597 
 
*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
